The 2012 Games: The regeneration legacy
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Published by:
RICS, Parliament Square, London SW1P 3AD
United Kingdom

A report for Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors commissioned by London Regional Board of RICS.

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# Executive summary

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Introduction

There are ambitious regeneration aspirations associated with the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games including: to transform the heart of East London (DCMS, 2007) and to give the communities hosting the Games the same chances as residents in other London Boroughs (Host Boroughs, 2009). This report assesses the planning and delivery of the physical regeneration legacy associated with the 2012 Games. The report focuses on projects in East London and is based on a combination of primary and secondary research. Primary research involved interviews with individuals representing key organisations involved in the project. Secondary research involved a comprehensive review of academic research and official London 2012 reports.

A review of past cases

To develop criteria with which to assess London’s regeneration legacy planning, six previous examples of event regeneration have been analysed. The case studies are:

- The 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield
- The 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona
- The 1998 FIFA Football World Cup in Paris
- The 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney
- The 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester
- The 2006 Commonwealth Games in Melbourne

These case studies highlight several key lessons that have been consolidated into a set of good practice criteria (see Table A). Five of these criteria are regarded as particularly important: multi-level governance, a framework that facilitates broader regeneration, building on existing plans, balancing event delivery / event legacy and integrating event sites. The six previous case studies of event regeneration have also been used to produce a set of different ‘models’ that represent an overview of different approaches used and their relative merits (Figure A).

An evaluation of London 2012

The London 2012 project performs well against the good practice criteria in Table A. Regeneration legacy planning has been addressed more convincingly and earlier than in most previous cases, allowing proposals to be properly debated, prepared and modified. The 2012 project scores highly against the criteria deemed to be most important to securing a positive physical regeneration legacy. However, there are several issues that need to be addressed as preparations continue. These include the integration of the Olympic Park with surrounding areas, the need for increased emphasis on projects that will benefit East London more widely and a clearer plan for the transformation of the Park post-event.

The case of London 2012 can also be located on a model representing different delivery options. This model plots projects according to the stage at which events are used within the regeneration process and the diversity of stakeholders involved. The way that London 2012 builds on and integrates with long-established projects and plans for Stratford means it performs well against the first criterion. With reference to the second, a broad range of agencies are involved with different levels of government represented. The original plan was to attract more private sector funding but these plans have had to be rethought because of the global economic crisis. This means the 2012 Games does not quite enter the optimal zone on the model (marked in purple on Figure A), but London seems to be a good position compared to previous host cities.
Major events can best assist regeneration efforts when they are organised by a consortia of municipal, regional and national agencies, not merely municipalities.

The institutional framework needs to allow regeneration of event sites to be integrated within broader urban regeneration.

An organisation dedicated to legacy issues – whose life extends before and after duration of the event – needs to be established.

There is a need to ensure that when public assets are privatised, or the private sector becomes more involved, measures are introduced to secure public interests and wider outcomes.

At the early stages of event projects, there needs to be more realism about cost overruns and revenue / benefit shortfalls.

Measures need to be put in place to ensure regeneration outcomes are not compromised when there is pressure to balance event budgets.

Changes in real estate values generated by event projects should be used to offset costs. More innovative ways of funding event projects should be explored.

Sufficient human and capital resources need to be committed throughout the lifetime of event regeneration projects to achieve sustained effects.

Events achieve the best outcomes when they are used to accelerate, extend or revive existing urban regeneration projects.

There needs to be more emphasis on (long term) event regeneration and less on (short term) event management priorities.

Extra effort needs to be made to integrate events sites with existing populations, physically; but also socially and economically.

Parallel regeneration initiatives and more diverse regeneration projects are required that are not reliant on event projects.

The efficient delivery of venues and associated regeneration projects should not be at the expense of processes that guarantee transparency, democratic accountability and community input.

Decisions need to be made as to whether event sites should be regenerated as specialist destinations, or as a conventional / multi-functional urban areas.

The choice of site is crucial – ideally, it should be one where suppressed potential can be unlocked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for assessment (shading denotes double weighting)</th>
<th>London 2012 Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Major events can best assist regeneration efforts when they are organised by a consortia of municipal, regional and national agencies, not merely municipalities.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The institutional framework needs to allow regeneration of event sites to be integrated within broader urban regeneration.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. An organisation dedicated to legacy issues – whose life extends before and after duration of the event – needs to be established.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. There is a need to ensure that when public assets are privatised, or the private sector becomes more involved, measures are introduced to secure public interests and wider outcomes.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. At the early stages of event projects, there needs to be more realism about cost overruns and revenue / benefit shortfalls.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Measures need to be put in place to ensure regeneration outcomes are not compromised when there is pressure to balance event budgets.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Changes in real estate values generated by event projects should be used to offset costs. More innovative ways of funding event projects should be explored.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sufficient human and capital resources need to be committed throughout the lifetime of event regeneration projects to achieve sustained effects.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Events achieve the best outcomes when they are used to accelerate, extend or revive existing urban regeneration projects.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. There needs to be more emphasis on (long term) event regeneration and less on (short term) event management priorities.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Extra effort needs to be made to integrate events sites with existing populations, physically; but also socially and economically.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Parallel regeneration initiatives and more diverse regeneration projects are required that are not reliant on event projects.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. The efficient delivery of venues and associated regeneration projects should not be at the expense of processes that guarantee transparency, democratic accountability and community input.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Decisions need to be made as to whether event sites should be regenerated as specialist destinations, or as a conventional / multi-functional urban areas.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The choice of site is crucial – ideally, it should be one where suppressed potential can be unlocked.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL SCORE (out of 200) 165

See section 3 for more detail
Conclusions

This report concludes that admirable efforts have been made to optimise the chances of a positive regeneration legacy from the 2012 Games. The regeneration legacy planning for the 2012 Games has performed well against the criteria developed here, suggesting that London is in a good position compared to previous host cities.

Particular examples of good practice include:

- The choice of a site that provided good opportunities for regeneration
- The early onset of legacy planning
- Involving a wide range of different stakeholders
- Unequivocal support from the UK Government
- Building on long term plans for London and existing regeneration projects
- The expression of aspirations for the wider area beyond the Olympic Park
- Attention to social and economic regeneration, as well as physical transformation.

Transforming the heart of East London and achieving convergence between the Host Boroughs and other London Boroughs are ambitious aspirations, particularly in the current economic climate. This means that despite some excellent planning, complete success is not guaranteed. The success of aspirations to use London 2012 to deliver urban regeneration in East London will ultimately depend on:

- Delivering regeneration in East London generally, rather than merely transforming the Olympic Park.
- Generating future capital investment in the Olympic Park.
- Encouraging patient and sustained commitment to the project.
- Maximising the value of the public’s stake in the Olympic Park.
- Producing and delivering proposals to allow social and economic development to be derived from the physical regeneration of East London.
In 2003 the UK Government decided to back a London bid for the Olympic and Paralympic Games. This support was based on the principle that staging these Games would create opportunities that would ‘flow to all levels and well beyond the sports sector’ (DCMS, 2003). Even at this early stage, the regeneration of East London was a key justification for staging the Games.

In announcing the Government’s support for a London bid, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport promised that ‘the Lower Lea Valley would benefit from new facilities and regeneration’ (Hansard, 2003). Proposals for the Games were conceived in the context of the 2004 London Plan that identified East London as the key location for the city’s future growth and development. In the Candidate File submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) one of the four themes that underpinned London’s bid was ‘Benefiting the community through regeneration’ (London 2012, 2004). The success of the bid in 2005 meant that this vision had to be turned into a deliverable project. In 2007, regeneration ambitions were consolidated via the promise to use the Games to ‘Transform the heart of East London’ (DCMS, 2007). The UK Government remains committed to this aspiration, although the project has inevitably evolved further since 2007. A review of the key moments in regeneration legacy planning from 2003-2011 is provided in Table 1.1.

1.1 Aims

This report aims to assess the planning and delivery of the physical regeneration legacy associated with the 2012 Games. The objectives of the report are to:

a) devise a set of criteria with which to assess event regeneration projects

b) use these criteria to evaluate the regeneration legacy planning associated with the 2012 Games

The report has a specific geographical and thematic focus, namely: East London (the 5 Host Boroughs: Greenwich, Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest) and regeneration led by physical change. The report acknowledges that there are wider objectives of staging the 2012 Games but these are not addressed specifically here.

1.2 Methods

The report is based on a combination of primary and secondary research.

The primary research involved interviews with individuals representing key organisations involved in the project: the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA); the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC); the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG); the London Development Agency (LDA); the London Borough of Newham (LBN); the London Borough of Hackney (LBN) and members of the consortium that will own and manage the affordable housing in the Olympic Village (First Base and East Thames).

The secondary research involved two main elements: a comprehensive review of academic research regarding six previous examples of event regeneration; and a detailed review of official London 2012 reports.

1.3 The structure of the report

The two main sections of the report follow this introduction. Each of these sections deals with one of the objectives detailed above. In Section 2 the aim is to produce a framework with which to assess London’s regeneration legacy planning. Previous case studies of urban regeneration projects involving major sport events are reviewed to produce a set of good practice criteria. These criteria are then used to frame an overall evaluation of London 2012 legacy planning and delivery from 2003 to 2011 (Section 3). The report concludes with a summary of key findings, a set of factors that will determine whether the aspiration to ‘transform the heart of East London’ will succeed, and some suggestion for future research (Section 4).

1 Interviews took place between July and October 2010.
2 Researchers interviewed eleven people from eight organisations. Several of these representatives were also involved in other relevant groups: Stratford Renaissance Partnership, London Thames Gateway Development Corporation (LTGDC), East London Legacy Board (ELLB).
# Table 1.1 A summary of the regeneration legacy planning for the 2012 Games 2003-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Key aspects of 2012 legacy planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>A report by surveyors Insignia Richard Ellis identifies four potential sites for a London Games. All are in East London because of the Mayor of London's plans, the IOC's requirements and opportunities to leave an important legacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Studies into the feasibility and ‘winiability’ of a London bid centred on the Lower Lea Valley are submitted to the UK Government by Arup and UK Sport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>After various debates and committee meetings, the UK Government announces that they are prepared to back a London bid. A Memorandum of Understanding is signed by the UK Government and the Mayor of London to provide a funding package should the bid be successful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>London’s Bid is submitted to the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The proposals are located within the London Plan and a wider programme of regeneration for East London. London’s Bid Book claims: “Tens of thousands of lives will be improved by new jobs and sustainable new housing, new sports venues and other facilities” (London 2012, 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>London wins the right to stage the Games. An IOC press release reaffirms the London bid team’s claim that the Olympic Park will contribute to the regeneration of an entire community, become a hub for East London, bring communities together and act as a catalyst for profound social and economic change (London 2012, 2004). The London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) is set up to take responsibility for staging the Games.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006 establishes the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) with a mission ‘to deliver venues, facilities, infrastructure and transport for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games on time, to budget and to leave a lasting legacy’ (ODA, 2006). The Olympic Programme is agreed between various stakeholders. The London Development Agency (LDA) is tasked with land assembly; with the UK Government and the Mayor allocated responsibilities for long-term regeneration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>In March 2007 the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) announces a revised Games budget of £9.325 billion, up from original figure of c.£4 billion (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 2008). The contribution from public funds increases by £5.906 billion to compensate for omissions in the original budget and a reduced contribution from the private sector (NAO, 2007). The DCMS publishes five key promises for the 2012 Games, one of which is “to transform the heart of East London” (DCMS, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>The DCMS Action Plan outlines the main ambitions for transforming the heart of East London. Headline ambitions are to build over 9,000 new homes and to help 20,000 workless Londoners from the 5 Host Boroughs into permanent employment by 2012 (DCMS, 2008). Envisaged private sector funding fails to materialise and it is announced that contingency funds will need to be used to build the athlete’s village and media centres. The London Development Agency’s Olympic Legacy Directorate is established and their work is supported by the Mayor’s Legacy Advisory Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>The Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) is published by the 5 Host Boroughs. This sets out a ‘convergence’ agenda to offer (in twenty years) equivalent social and economic chances in the Host Boroughs to those offered by the average London Borough. A new agency is established – the East London Legacy Board (ELLB) – to support the implementation of the SRF. It brings together officials from key stakeholders. A new Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) takes over the lead on legacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The OPLC publish their vision for the Olympic Park. The aspiration is to have ‘the best of London all in one place’. The proposals represent a shift from the previous emphasis on high density housing towards a landscape of quality family homes, waterways, parklands and open spaces – anchored by London 2010 venues’ (OPLC, 2010a). The UK Government announces that the LDA and the OPLC will cease to exist in the post-event era.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>West Ham United Football Club and the London Borough of Newham are announced as the preferred bidders to take ownership of the stadium post-event. The Mayor of London announces a consultation exercise on the creation of an Olympic Park Development Corporation. Following the logic of the localism agenda this Mayoral agency would take over responsibilities currently allocated to the LDA, OPLC and ODA. Sale of the Olympic Village to Qatari Diar and Delancey for £557 million.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before London’s legacy planning can be properly evaluated, it is important to understand previous examples of event regeneration. This section of the report reviews six key previous case studies where major events were used to assist urban regeneration. A range of credible secondary sources has been analysed to produce the review. The examples are analysed in a structured manner, with a particular focus on contexts, delivery mechanisms, outcomes and key lessons. Analysis of the case studies is used as the basis for two further outputs:

1) the identification of a set of criteria for good practice
2) a set of different ‘models’ which represent an overview of different approaches used and their relative success

In Section 3 these outputs are applied directly to the London 2012 case study.

2.1 Justifications for the choice of case studies

The examples reviewed are listed below:
- The 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield
- The 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona
- The 1998 FIFA Football World Cup in Paris
- The 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney
- The 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester
- The 2006 Commonwealth Games in Melbourne

The main justifications for the case studies are their comparability with the London 2012 project in terms of contexts and objectives. The two largest multi-sport events staged in the UK to date are included in the analysis. Additionally, the Olympic Games of 1992 and 2000 are reviewed due to their comparable contexts and reputations as agents of city wide, and localised, regeneration respectively. These events are well researched examples and ones where regeneration was a key objective. Other Olympic Games have not been selected; either because of the incomparable context (Seoul, Beijing); or the noted neglect of regeneration ambitions (Athens, Atlanta). The case study of the Stade de France and the associated regeneration of the Plaine St. Denis district in Paris is included because of the comparable context and ambitions. Here, like in London, a mega-event (The FIFA World Cup) was used to help regenerate an under-utilised and disadvantaged part of a global capital. The case of the 2006 Commonwealth Games (Melbourne, Australia) is also part of the review due to its comparable context and relative anonymity – which has obscured some good (and recent) practice.
### 2.2 The 1991 World Student Games in Sheffield

#### Table 2.1 Summary of Sheffield’s World Student Games regeneration project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Sheffield, UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of event</td>
<td>World Student Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year staged</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of physical changes</td>
<td>Don Valley – eastern corridor into city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former use of main site</td>
<td>Industrial area dominated by metal manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main sport facilities</td>
<td>New athletics stadium; new indoor arena, swimming complex, new leisure centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of main venues</td>
<td>£147 million (Foley, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated regeneration</td>
<td>Refurbishment of Lyceum Theatre, renovation of housing estate, links to other concurrent projects (e.g. Supertram)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of associated regeneration</td>
<td>£12 million for theatre restoration (Smith, 1991)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2.1 The context

The 1991 World Student Games (WSG) aimed to lead the post-industrial regeneration of Sheffield, in particular the Don Valley where the main venues were situated. In the 1970s, 45,000 people were employed here mainly in the steel industry (Lawless and Ramsden, 1990) but by 1993, 90% of Sheffield’s steel industry jobs had been lost (Taylor et al., 1996). A consultancy report published in 1987 identified the need for several flagship projects funded from private and public sector sources to lead the redevelopment of the Don Valley (Lawless and Ramsden, 1990). In the context of Los Angeles’ profitable Olympic Games of 1984 and UK cities’ use of major events to revive their fortunes (e.g. National Garden Festivals and Glasgow’s European City of Culture project), Sheffield City Council leaders saw the 1991 WSG as a great opportunity to lead the city’s regeneration.

2.2.2 Delivery mechanisms

The WSG project was delivered through a number of agencies, all strongly linked to Sheffield City Council. Anticipated income from commercial sources (e.g. ticket sales, broadcast revenues, sponsorship) was not realised and the project was poorly supported by national government. This left the City Council with a large financial burden at a time when the UK Government was trying to restrain council borrowing and spending. A private trust was established to access private capital and this trust accessed overseas loans to be repaid over a 20 year period (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999). The trust involved two subsidiary organisations – one to administer and raise funds (Universiade GB) and one to manage major facilities (Sheffield for Health). Escalating costs and insufficient revenues meant Universiade GB was wound up in 1990, requiring the City Council to move into a more active role (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999). Construction costs, excluding the Arena, were all underwritten by the City Council.

The final bill for the construction of Games facilities amounted to £147 million (initial capital costs were estimated at £29 million), leaving a large public debt which has been paid for by increased council tax payments for Sheffield residents ever since. It is estimated that every adult citizen pays an extra £25 per year to pay for the event (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999).

Although the project was led by the City Council, the WSG has been described as the first significant partnership between Sheffield’s local government and the private sector. The Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC) had been established in 1986 but some feel that this was a ‘fortuitous coincidence’ (Roche, 1994), rather than the result of deliberately integrated planning. It should also be noted that the SERC was still dominated by the City Council and civic institutions – with only minor involvement from the private sector. Ultimately, the WSG was an opportunistic project delivered by the City Council and led by ‘enthusiastic champions’ (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999). Roche (1994) thought the leadership of the project lacked strategic experience, organisational ability and democratic legitimacy. There was a related failure to cultivate a sense of public ownership of the WSG (Roche, 1994). Conventional policy processes were bypassed in the rush to secure and deliver the event. There was a lack of public consultation, feasibility research, monitoring and project evaluation (Bramwell, 1997). There was also a lack of strategic planning. Most of the strategies that sought to exploit the opportunity presented by the Games were developed retrospectively – after the event was planned and staged. The project was not well integrated into other policy and planning. There were limited connections with the 1986 Draft Local Plan for the area (Lawless and Ramsden, 1990) and the project was divorced from the work of an urban regeneration company (SDC) which had been founded in 1987 to lead the physical regeneration of the Don Valley (Booth, 2005). Ultimately, the WSG aimed to achieve regeneration mainly through the image benefits that officials believed would result from the event and the high profile physical investments involved in staging it (Dabinett, 1991).
2.2.3 Post-event

Despite ongoing negative publicity about the financial legacy of the WSG, there was an organisational legacy that may have benefited subsequent regeneration efforts. Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) felt that partnerships developed held up well in the post-event period. After the Games the SERC evolved into the City Liaison Group which took a more active role. In 1995 Sheffield for Health was replaced by Sheffield International Venues Ltd – a company owned by the City Trust. The venues have been used both by elite athletes and by the community. However, there have been concerns about reductions to existing Council budgets (in particular funds for leisure provision) to help pay for the WSG facilities (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999). The event facilitated the refurbishment of the Lyceum Theatre, but wider regeneration projects were restricted by budget constraints. The economic recession of the early 1990s also ‘curtailed some of the catalytic effects of the WSG’ (Sheffield City Council, 1993).

One significant change in the urban fabric was the renovation and partial demolition of the Hyde Park housing estate used for the athletics accommodation which was derelict before the WSG. The changes made to the Don Valley have received a mixed response. New facilities have been provided and physical renewal undertaken, but ‘industrial reconstruction’ has proved more difficult. Booth (2005: 266) concludes ‘what is doubtful is the extent to which the regeneration has actually helped those most in need’. Whilst the short term effects were disappointing, 20 years on the Games is viewed as a flawed strategy, but one which left a physical environment and institutional framework that has aided Sheffield’s subsequent progress.

2.2.4 Key implications

- The WSG showed that event projects need better planning and more public consultation. The WSG was an opportunistic project – the opportunity came up to bid and the city took it without first developing an associated strategy.
- The WSG proved there needs to be more realism about cost overruns and revenue shortfalls. This is now a recognised problem and UK mega-projects are now usually required to include contingency funds within budget calculations (Flyvbjerg, 2007).
- Ideally, major events need regional, national, or even international public sector partners to ensure risks are spread. Smith (1991) concluded that ‘it is unrealistic to imagine that local authorities on their own can successfully implement cultural or sporting events on this scale’.
- The WSG demonstrated the need to integrate events within broader urban regeneration strategies.
- Controversies over ownership of venues demonstrate the choice between flexibility and profit maximisation versus public service and accountability. The case also highlighted the dilemma regarding whether sport policy should be viewed primarily as a welfare tool or as a generator of revenue (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999).
53°23’01”N 1°28’01”W
1991 World Student Games, Sheffield
2.0 A review of six previous case studies of event regeneration

2.3 The 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona

Table 2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of event</td>
<td>Olympic and Paralympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year staged</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of physical changes</td>
<td>Port Olimpic (eastern waterfront area adjacent to centre), Montjuic (western hillside adjacent to city centre), Val d’Hebron (north of the city adjacent to centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former use of main site</td>
<td>Olympic Ring: mixture of parkland + venues and landscaping from previous event (1929 Expo). Olympic Village: railway infrastructure. Vall d’Hebron: urban space with some sports facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main sport facilities</td>
<td>Olympic Ring: Olympic Stadium (reconstructed from shell of former stadium), Sant Jordi Pavilion (new indoor arena), INEF building, Picornell Swimming Pool (covered and remodelled). Vall d’Hebron: Sports Pavilion, Tennis Complex (plus existing velodrome)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of main venues</td>
<td>9.1% of total construction costs (Brunet, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated regeneration</td>
<td>Regeneration of waterfront, new public spaces, upgrading of airport, hotel development, improvements to communications, transport and drainage infrastructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of associated regeneration</td>
<td>US$9.105 billion (Vigor et al., 2004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3.1 The context

In 1986 Barcelona won the right to stage the 1992 Olympic Games. Barcelona’s Olympic strategy was heavily influenced by three contextual considerations. First, the momentous political changes that had taken place in Spain during the 1970s and the subsequent desire of Barcelona’s leaders to compensate for the city’s neglect during the period 1939-1975. Second, the need to formulate a strategy that would deal with de-industrialisation and high unemployment – a problem Barcelona shared with many European cities during this period. And third, the city’s history of using major events to transform physical areas; particularly the 1888 Universal Exhibition and the 1929 World’s Fair (Blanco, 2009). Monclús (2007) also cited the unrealised plans for a World Expo in 1982 as something that laid the foundations for the Olympic project, and the city had previously bid for the 1972 Games. This combination of factors explains why the Olympic Games became a project that received widespread support within Barcelona.

2.3.2 Delivery mechanisms

The regeneration associated with Barcelona’s Olympic Games was ‘a classic urban planning strategy, led by and largely financed by the public sector’ (Marshall, 1996). Leadership was provided by the City Council, in particular by Mayor Pasqual Maragall (1982-1997). The basic approach was to use public capital to simulate future investment from the private sector. As the strategy evolved it began to reflect the general trend at the time for more public-private partnerships. The strategy involved a successful partnership of government stakeholders at different (national, regional and local) levels. To a lesser extent, partnerships were also formed with citizen groups (in initial projects) and private organisations (latterly). The involvement of citizen groups managed to alter some initiatives so that they acted in the interests of local people. Local neighbourhood associations lost out to real estate interests in some instances (Blakeley, 2005), but the level of civic dialogue was an improvement on Sheffield’s top-down approach. The strategy was also an improvement on Sheffield’s approach as it was linked to wider city plans and long term objectives for the city (Busquets, 2005).

Some of the key initiatives (e.g. to revalorise the waterfront) had been envisaged since the 1960s and the Olympics hastened and secured the delivery of several projects that were only loosely linked to the event. The changes made to the four main Olympic sites were perhaps the exception, but even here there were efforts to link initiatives into the wider plans for the city (Busquets, 2005).

The Barcelona Olympic Games were an example of event-themed regeneration – where a diverse range of projects are associated with a unifying theme. Only a small proportion of the budget (9.1%, Brunet, 2009) was spent on staging the event directly. Instead the focus was on providing public space, updating infrastructure and adapting the morphology of the city. These objectives were achieved through good leadership, the input of urban experts and the spirit of citizen co-operation (Monclús, 2007).

The Olympic projects were guided initially by robust urban development plans that were located within the General Metropolitan Plan of 1976 (Busquets, 2005). Interventions were initially small scale, piecemeal and neighbourhood based. But from the late 1980s a series of strategic plans were prepared in conjunction with the Games. Monclús (2007) notes how these plans were based on North American precedents. These were not traditional spatial plans. Instead they provided a wider vision of the city and focused on general aims including improving communications, quality of life and business success.

There were several plans published in the period 1988-1995 and these became progressively more ambitious and more private sector driven. For example, the Barcelona Economic and Social Plan 2000 – that covered the period 1988-93 – was formulated by an executive council made up of 10 leading stakeholders that included private sector representatives. Blakeley (2005) identified that Barcelona’s Mayor was crucial in producing these growth coalitions oriented around projects for the Olympic Games.

The main Olympic projects were co-ordinated by HOLSA an organisation formed from the Municipal Institute for Urban Development Promotion. Busquets (2005) described HOLSA as a special urban development apparatus and it consisted of a joint venture between the local administration and central government. This type of multi-level governance was unusual for Barcelona and it would not have been possible without exceptional circumstances of organising the Games (Monclús, 2007).
The selection of locations for new facilities was something negotiated by Barcelona’s Olympic Organising Committee (COOB) and the City Council. Existing venues were used wherever possible. New facilities were only built in areas that needed them, or in parts of the city where regeneration was a priority (Truno, 1995).

The Barcelona Olympic project involved remodelling several key locations, rather than delivering regeneration in one concentrated zone. The four main venue sites were assisted by improvements made to the road infrastructure that linked them and by their integration into city plans. Although the projects on Montjuïc are well known, the Olympic Village and the improvements to Vall d’Hebron are the best examples of urban regeneration. Different locations for the Olympic Village were considered, but Parc de Mar was selected as it provided the opportunity to reconfigure a key site and reorganise the city’s structure. An urban development plan was prepared and this facilitated the reclamation of 100ha of industrial land. New housing units were built, railway lines were re-routed, a major road was covered, the promenade extended, a new marina created, beaches rejuvenated and new hotels and office space constructed. The sports complex developed at Vall d’Hebron is even less well appreciated. This site on the edge of the city centre was already semi-developed and the opportunity was taken to organise this chaotic urban space (Truno, 1995).

A variety of funding sources were used. Most venue projects were paid for by public money (EU, City Council, Spanish State, publicly owned companies), but 33% of Olympic investment was derived from private companies (Brunet, 2009). Some projects – e.g. the sailing centre – were funded through property sales (of mooring and commercial premises, Truno, 1995). Where new facilities were required, they were built on land that was owned by the City Council. This included more than 56 hectares of land acquired from former industrial uses in 1976 (Monclús, 2007). The use of publicly owned land meant that facilities were ceded to public authorities after the Games. However a new byelaw introduced in 1991 meant that private organisations were allowed to obtain management rights for new public installations by entering an open competition (Truno, 1995). A municipal joint stock company (Barcelona Promocion) was created to manage the four flagship venues (Palau St Jordi, The Olympic Stadium, Velodrome and Swimming Pool; Truno, 1995).

2.3.3 Post-event

Barcelona’s Olympic regeneration is generally considered to have been successful (Monclús, 2007). Whether considered as a series of individual projects or as a unified scheme, assessments have usually been positive. The regeneration projects associated with the Olympics have laid the foundation for ambitious plans delivered in the 1990s such as improvements to El Raval, Diagonal Mar and Poblenou (Blanco, 2009). Of the many of the projects implemented by the city, the initial projects are normally seen as most successful – because they dealt with ‘historic’ ambitions. Garcia and Claver (2003) state that the Olympic regeneration managed to help a wide section of the population because public space was improved and housing was upgraded.
In terms of the sport venues, the legacy also seems generally positive. Truno (1995) feels that the provision of accessible sailing, riding and swimming venues has made elite sports more accessible. Good legacy planning meant low exposure to maintenance costs and Barcelona Promocio – the company tasked with managing the four main venues – was self-sufficient in the first six years of its existence (Truno, 1995). Many of the facilities were leased to sports organisations – for example the Olympic stadium was used by the Espanyol football club until recently. The original focus on improving existing venues and only building new ones where there was clear need, combined with the provision of flexible venues, seems to have resulted in good use of facilities in the post-event period.

Despite the recognition of success, a number of critiques have emerged in recent years that question aspects of the Barcelona strategy (Balibrea, 2001). One recurring criticism is the neglect of social considerations. Some link this to an over-emphasis on place marketing and economic considerations in latter stages of Olympic preparations (Monclus, 2007). The Olympic Village is used as an illustrative example. Here, initial plans to provide social housing were abandoned when the (high) value of the new housing stock on the private market became clear (Busquets, 2005). More general issues with housing legacies have also been raised. The Olympic projects were partly responsible for rises in house prices that have displaced some people and public sector housing to the metropolitan periphery. Furthermore, Marshall (1996) suggested that employment objectives were unclear and weakly developed.

2.3.4 Key implications

- The Barcelona Games showed the potential for using mega-events to deliver long term urban regeneration plans.
- The case also demonstrated the value of using mega-events to secure national / supra-national funding for municipal regeneration. In Barcelona, funding from State (12% of total Olympic investment) and Regional Governments (15%) was much higher than that committed by the City Council (2%) (Brunet, 2009).
- Barcelona’s Olympic projects also showed that uniting a diverse set of regeneration projects under an Olympic theme can help urban authorities to gain support from a wide range of internal and external stakeholders.
- The difficulties fulfilling aspirations to provide social housing demonstrated the challenge of trying to cover project costs and achieve social objectives.
- As Garcia and Olaver (2003) stated, Barcelona’s Olympic regeneration is a unique case because of the political context in which it occurred and because it involved an ‘unfreezing’ of the city after years of neglect rather than conventional regeneration. This limits transferability of policy lessons.
2.4 The 1998 FIFA Football World Cup in Paris

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Paris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of event</td>
<td>FIFA World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year staged</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of physical changes</td>
<td>St. Denis (1.5km north of the city centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former use of main site</td>
<td>Gasworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main sport facilities</td>
<td>New stadium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of main venues</td>
<td>€407million (Dauncey, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated regeneration</td>
<td>Covering of motorway, two bridges across canal, landscaping of canalside, housing improvements, commercial development (retail, cinema), new office development, new transport provision</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4.1 The context

The FIFA World Cup differs from multi-sport events such as the Olympic Games and the WSG that are concentrated in one municipality: it involves multiple cities staging one sport. However, Olympic cities can learn useful lessons from developments undertaken in Plaine St. Denis, Paris where a new stadium (the Stade de France) was constructed to host the 1998 FIFA World Cup Final. This site was chosen because it offered the potential for both urban regeneration and commercial development. The central government initially considered two alternative locations but the opportunity to support established urban regeneration plans meant Plaine St. Denis was selected. This area, 1.5km north of the centre, had been affected by de-industrialisation but also by obstructive transport infrastructure. In 1940, 50,000 people were employed here mainly in manufacturing industries and energy production (Lecroart, 2009). By 1986 there were 200 hectares of vacant land and the number of people employed had fallen to 27,000 (Lecroart, 2009).

The site for the new stadium was formerly a gasworks which had been derelict since 1980. Prior to the Stade de France project three local authorities (communes) had strived to stimulate development here with little success and in 1991 these communes had prepared a joint charter to co-ordinate the redevelopment of the area. Simultaneously, the French National Government 1988-91 planned to alleviate inequalities in the Paris area and their 1990 White Paper identified Plaine St. Denis as a priority site. The successful bid for the 1998 World Cup in the early 1990s was a fortuitous coincidence and provided an unexpected driver of the project (Lecroart, 2009). In 1993 St. Denis was confirmed as the location for the event’s main stadium. This decision was taken by the central government who promoted the project as one led by urban regeneration motives (Newman and Tual, 2002). The existing plans and shared ambitions here provided a useful foundation for the project.

2.4.2 Delivery mechanisms

Regeneration plans and institutions did exist in the Plaine St. Denis area prior to the Stade de France project. For example, a development agency had been created whose aim was to bring public and private funds together to stimulate regeneration (Newman and Tual, 2002). However, until the stadium project was confirmed there was not enough public funding for redevelopment and there were insufficient incentives for private sector companies to invest in the area (Newman and Thornley, 1996). Although it was well located the area had a poor image and a large regeneration project was needed to unlock its potential. The existing development agency did not own land and could only make limited land purchases and ownership of the former gasworks had passed to the City of Paris when production had ceased in 1980 (Newman and Thornley, 1996). This meant any project to develop the site had to involve some form of multi-level governance involving the City of Paris, the local communes (St. Denis, Aubervilliers, St. Ouen), the regional government (Ile-de-France) as well as the national administration.

The delivery of the Stade de France project involved a range of stakeholders, representing different spatial scales, albeit with strong central government involvement. Local communes were not happy for the national administration to assume control of the project as they had in other large scale projects in Paris such as the redevelopment of La Défense (Newman and Thornley, 1996). State involvement was needed because locally co-ordinated efforts in the 1990s had been under-funded and unsuccessful (Newman and Tual, 2002). The communes were initially reluctant to co-operate with the stadium project ‘fearing distortion of their own planning objectives and the sterilisation of the area’ (Newman and Thornley, 1996). However, the state government’s urgent need to deliver a stadium to a fixed deadline increased the local communes’ bargaining power. This meant local mayors were able to influence the project to prioritise local jobs, transport improvements, better integration of the project with the local area and inclusion of housing projects within the plans (Newman and Thornley, 1996).

According to Newman and Thornley (1996), the decision to use Plaine St. Denis for the World Cup radically changed the development of this area because it brought strong national planning and state funding which gave the private sector sufficient confidence to invest. The area around the stadium included a Zone d’Aménagement Concerté (ZAC) providing special land purchasing rights. The project was delivered using a conventional approach; with the state formulating a basic master plan and delivering key infrastructure which provided the platform for subsequent private sector investment. However, the event dimension raised the profile of the project and instigated immovable deadlines.
Planning permissions were required and local plans had to be re-negotiated and this had to be sanctioned by the communes, giving local authorities more power to ensure the stadium project was integrated with their own plans for the area (Newman and Tual, 2002). The Contrat de Ville for the area (part of French urban policy involving an agreement between national government and local stakeholders) included requirements for housing and social provision and the involvement of the communes ensured that the stadium project was linked to these. An agency was created to help local businesses win contracts and local mayors managed to ensure that a large number of the 1500 jobs created went to local residents (Body-Gendrot, 2003). Other key benefits secured by local communes included a bridge linking the stadium to the disadvantaged Franc Moisons housing estate (Newman and Tual, 2002). The contract to construct and manage the stadium was awarded to a consortium of developers in 1995. Developing the district around the stadium was entrusted to SANEM – a partnership of public and private organisations. The state was a majority shareholder, but the communes, the regional government, banks, utility companies and the Chamber of Commerce were also involved. SANEM delivered and managed a mixed use development adjacent to the stadium. This included canalside housing, shopping and leisure facilities and new office development. Four other pieces of land, each around 20 hectares, were also developed as residential areas and as commercial / mixed-use zones (Lecroart, 2009). Concurrently, the French government delivered a series of infrastructural improvements including the covering of the motorway, new parks, a new RER station and improvements to other local train stations. Dauncey (1999) felt that the stadium project facilitated regeneration through the improved transport links and the economic stimulus it provided. However, as the local communes were concerned that the project would be limited to infrastructure projects – at the expense of wider regeneration – they configured institutions to influence the projects and link them to the wider redevelopment of Plaine St. Denis. A joint planning agency allowed the communes to work in a co-ordinated fashion and a Public Space Commission was established in 1996 to manage the environmental changes in the interests of the locality (Newman and Tual, 2002). The basic aim was to ensure that the stadium precinct was not artificially divorced from the surrounding areas which it was meant to assist.

2.4.3 Post-event

In the years since the construction of the Stade de France, the surrounding area has been transformed into a new district made up of ‘4 towns in 1’. This includes provision for students (28,000 in total), visitors, commuters (70% of workers live outside the area) and inhabitants (most of those employed work outside the area) (Newman and Tual, 2002). 25,000 new jobs have been provided here, more than the target figure of 23,000 (Lecroart, 2009). Plaine St. Denis has become a new business district which has attracted significant investment, including further public funds and a large number of foreign investors. 800,000 square metres of office space has been developed since 2000 (Lecroart, 2009). Nappi-Choulet (2006) stated that long term regeneration has been achieved by attracting short term ‘pioneer’ investors who only intended to take ownership of assets for a limited time period before re-selling. Development has now spread outside the immediate vicinity of the stadium and the area directly to the south (towards the centre) has attracted a cluster of creative industries including fashion, media and internet companies. 5000 new housing units have been developed since 2000, 25% of which are social housing units (Lecroart, 2009). Residential house prices increased in the post-event period, but the area still remains the cheapest residential location in the region (Newman and Tual, 2002).

Although the regeneration of the area has provided a context conducive to economic development, it has not benefited those most in need. Most of the new employment is for white collar workers and there is a mismatch between these jobs and local skills (Lecroart, 2009). Pockets of deprivation remain and the lives of estate residents have not improved while the slow delivery of new transport links has meant the easterly and northerly parts of the site remain under-developed (Lecroart, 2009). Newman and Tual (2002) highlighted the risk that a ‘2 speed society’ may have been created with ongoing planning interventions required to avoid segregation of the new commercial district from the existing residential community. More powers that are now devolved to local communes may help to address this problem. A new partnership of local communes (Communauté de Communes) was created in 1999 to maintain pressure on the state to deliver its original commitments to the area. This is funded by local business taxes (Newman and Tual, 2002).
Although the area has evolved since 1998, and even though the World Cup has receded into the past, the stadium remains crucial to the area. The city’s main football club, Paris Saint-Germain, decided not to relocate there but it is used for events on around 275 days a year (Lecroart, 2009). More importantly the stadium has become a very positive symbol for the area – both for its residents and for the businesses who have relocated there. As Body-Gendrot (2003) identified, the World Cup allowed authorities to address the inner-city’s social problems such as juvenile delinquency and racism, mainly due to the success of France’s multi-ethnic football team on home soil during the tournament. The symbolic power of the stadium – and the symbolic capital added by the French victory – is not something limited to local residents. According to Newman and Tual (2002): ‘employers who want to impress prospective employees bring them to the stadium’. Overall, the event and the stadium are considered a success and the positive outcomes of the project encouraged Paris to bid for the 2008 and 2012 Olympic Games – with St. Denis designated as the key location. These bids failed, but some of the projects envisaged (a new swimming complex, hotel and convention facilities) are scheduled to be built on the site anyway (Lecroart, 2009).

2.4.4 Key implications

- The case demonstrates that large event venues paid for by the state can change the nature of the local property market and attract private investors looking essentially for quality of infrastructure and significant capital appreciation (Nappi-Choulet, 2005).
- Strong local involvement and cooperation between local authorities has been crucial. As Newman and Tual (2002) identified, locating the Stade de France in St. Denis was a national government project, but its impacts are being managed through co-operation between local authorities.
- The case illustrates that major events can help to unlock the potential of an area that has resisted redevelopment through market forces. The strategic location of the area (close to centre, next to motorway, close to airport) assisted the chances of success, and the improvement of transport infrastructure assisted regeneration post event.
- The case also highlights the importance of event projects in helping to address negative place images that can restrict regeneration. Plaine St. Denis’ image had previously dissuaded investors from buying property in this area, but the situation was improved greatly both by the event, and by the continued presence of a stadium that has become ‘associated with national success’ (Newman and Tual, 2002).
- Concerted efforts were made to integrate the stadium, but although physical links were made to local housing estates, social and economic links were harder to make.
2.5 The 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney

Table 2.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Sydney</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of event</td>
<td>Olympic and Paralympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year staged</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of physical changes</td>
<td>Homebush Bay (14km west of CBD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former use of main site</td>
<td>Former state abattoir, plus history as brickpit, chemical productions site, rubbish dump and munitions centre. Part of site used for showgrounds and park stemming from use for Bicentennial celebrations (1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main sport facilities</td>
<td>New main stadium, indoor ‘superdome’, aquatic centre, archery facility, tennis centre, baseball stadium, hockey centre, multi-purpose indoor venue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of main venues</td>
<td>AUS$1.7billion3 (Waitt, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated regeneration</td>
<td>Olympic Village, new rail link to central Sydney, waterfront development and provision of parklands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of associated regeneration</td>
<td>AUS$3.23billion (inc. new Airport rail-link US$500 million); expansion of Sydney Airport US$350 million) (Waitt, 1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 The UK Pound – Australian Dollar exchange rate during the period 1997-2000 was approx £1 = $2.10-2.75
2.5.1 The context

Australian cities had demonstrated their enthusiasm for staging major events before Sydney was nominated as the host of the Millennium Olympic Games. Melbourne had staged the 1956 Games, Expo '88 was used to lead the redevelopment of Brisbane and the New South Wales Government hoped to celebrate the Australian bicentenary by staging the Olympic Games in 1988. This is when discussion regarding the possibility of staging the Games in Homebush Bay commenced. Facilities for the 2000 Olympics in Sydney were concentrated in this 760 hectare foreshore site on land that had been earmarked for renewal since the 1970s (Cashman, 2009). Although the site was 14km from the centre, Homebush Bay was still regarded as being in the ‘geographical heartland of Sydney’s population’ because of the rapid expansion of the city (Cashman, 2006). The site was previously used as a brickpit, abattoir, chemical production site, rubbish dump and munitions centre (Wilson, 1996). Kearins and Pavlovich (2002) estimated that 20% of the site was contaminated and therefore the most fundamental part of the regeneration project was land remediation. Before the Games were won, the site had already been designated as a leisure destination. A sport centre was built there in the 1980s and part of the site had been developed for the 1988 Australian Bicentenary celebrations. A development corporation had been set up in 1985 to develop the area over a 30 year period – and the successful Olympic bid fast tracked this project. Unlike the Barcelona project(s), this redevelopment was not integrated into a wider metropolitan strategy, Sydney’s population was growing fast, property was very expensive and the government needed to manage the growth of the city. Lochhead (2005) noted the requirement for a large scale restructuring of the middle ring suburbs and Costley (2006) cited a series of issues including uncontained urban sprawl and the separation of communities and centres of employment. There was a related need to decentralise Sydney and to address acute transit issues but opportunities to allocate Homebush Bay a significant role in this urban restructuring were missed.

2.5.2 Delivery mechanisms

The delivery of Games facilities had begun before the success of Sydney’s bid was announced. An athletics centre and aquatic centre were under construction at the time of the bid, adding to the credibility of Sydney’s candidature. In bid documents, the environmental credentials of a Sydney Games were promoted (Kearins and Pavlovich, 2002). The organisers found it difficult to adhere to these admirable principles, but they did consult with environmental and voluntary groups especially in the early stages of their preparations.

Regeneration associated with the 2000 Sydney Games was ultimately led by the public sector; projects were underwritten by the New South Wales (NSW) Government. The NSW Government created an organising committee (SOCOG) and a co-ordination authority (OCA) with the latter taking over responsibility for developing the main Homebush Bay site. Other institutional arrangements ensured successful delivery of the project. The Sydney Games Co-ordinating Group was established in 1999 and the Minister of the Olympics was also appointed President of SOCOG. Sport was given a privileged role, partly because the Australian Olympic Committee which was able to demand the establishment of a Sport Commission (SSC) within SOCOG (Frawley and Toohey, 2009).

Pre-existing plans for the area were adapted after the success of the bid. Most of the land was already owned by the NSW or Federal Governments and the delivery of the project was guided by a master planning exercise. The first master plan was produced five years before the Games and the general approach adopted was in line with the BOOT model, where the OCA would Build, Own, Operate, then Transfer facilities (Poynter, 2009). Accordingly, once the Games were over, facilities were transferred to sport associations, local authorities and private companies.

There were nine major facilities in Homebush Bay. The government paid for some (e.g. the aquatics centre, tennis centre) and private companies were invited to construct and operate the major stadia (e.g. Olympic Stadium, Superdome Arena). A private sector consortium funded the main stadium via a public flotation on the Australian Stock Exchange (Poynter, 2009). However, only half the shares were sold because of the doubts about the long term use of the stadium. As the NSW Government also contributed to the costs, the Stadium will revert back to public ownership from 2030. This model of ownership is very similar to that used for the Stade de France (Poynter, 2009). Since the Games there have been debates about why the Stadium was so large, with the IOC President claiming in 2001 that his organisation had advised against building such a large arena (Cashman, 2006). Searle (2002) questioned the planning of both the Stadium and the Superdome. He concluded that there was insufficient consideration of the city’s long term recreational and entertainment needs when the venues were conceived.

The Olympic Village on the Western edge of the Olympic Park was designed by a private consortium (Mirvac Lend Lease Village Consortium) and it was funded through the development and sale of land adjacent to the project (Cashman, 2006). The Village was sold as private housing after the Games and it developed into a new suburb – Newington – housing a population of 5,000. However, this apparent success story involved a significant compromise. When it looked like the public sector would have to step in to fund the innovative sustainable approach, the original designs were abandoned. Subsequently, a further design competition was launched with lower environmental standards ensuring that any investment could be recouped by developers (Kearins and Pavlovich, 2002).
A new State Environmental Planning Policy (#38) was created to help Olympic projects pass smoothly through the planning system (Kearins and Pavlovich, 2002). The exemption of Olympic projects from normal Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures and the relaxation of conventional planning requirements allowed “the approval of developments that would probably not have proceeded under normal processes” (Owen, 2002). There was further controversy caused by the minimal involvement of local communities and local government authorities (LGAs). Homebush Bay is in Auburn LGA and although the OCA assumed responsibility for the site itself the LGA retained responsibility for some services including waste disposal and transport management. Although they benefited from the remediation of a large quantity of contaminated land, the LGA suffered a significant financial shortfall from the transfer of rateable land to the adjacent Council in exchange for land comprising part of the Park (which was non rateable). According to Owen (2002), Auburn LGA was also hindered by the OCA’s lack of openness, co-operation and inadequate provision of information while planning powers were centralised further diminishing the role and influence of LGAs. Auburn resisted the privatisation of its assets, feeling that they would more likely to be able to offer employment and control costs if facilities were retained under public ownership (Owen, 2002).

Organisations were established to enable consultation, but these were regarded as tokenistic and although the OCA complied with statutory requirements, the meaning and effectiveness of this consultation was questioned (Owen, 2002).

2.5.3 Post-event

Whilst the planning and delivery of the Sydney Games is regarded favourably, the delivery of legacy planning is less well regarded (Cashman, 2006). This relates both to the post-event use of the Olympic facilities and the wider objective to produce a regenerated metropolitan space.

The future of Homebush Bay post 2000 could have been planned more thoroughly before the event but the OCA was reluctant to divert staff time and resources from ensuring the event was staged successfully (Cashman, 2006). A legacy authority (Sydney Olympic Park Authority: SOPA) was established after the event to manage the Park (and two adjacent Parks) and awarded some start up funding to assist its efforts. SOPA’s original mission was to ensure the Park was managed as a special place for recreational, educational and business activities. This fitted with the original intention to create a unique sporting, cultural and recreational destination for the people of Sydney that included museums, cinemas and educational facilities as well as the venues, but a 10 year master plan published in 2002 included proposals for a vibrant town centre not envisaged at the time of Sydney’s bid. Eight key precincts were outlined around a town centre, with provision for 3,000 residents and 10,000 workers. This plan was criticised by Lochhead (2005) for being too short term and too limited in scale. Lochhead (2005) identified the need to overlay the monumental structure of the area with smaller buildings of six to eight storeys. Vision 2025 and then Vision 2030 were then published; master plans that superseded the 2002 master plan. These new plans proposed a denser urban core with a wider variety of uses. The idea is to introduce a range of housing types including affordable housing, hotels and hostels as well as developing a clear educational role that will differentiate it from surrounding areas (Lochhead, 2005). However, there remains confusion about whether the area should be developed as a specialist destination, or a fully functional urban zone.

The legacy of venues as well as the space around the venues has also been disappointing. The main stadium has been unable to attract enough events of sufficient scale to fill the 80,000+ seats and there is intense local competition from other stadia in Sydney (the Sydney Cricket Ground and the Sydney Football Stadium). Unmanageable debts (dating back to the construction of the stadium) owed by the Group that operated the stadium meant that in 2006 the major creditor ANZ Bank took over the management of the asset which was renamed the ANZ Stadium. The other major Olympic venue (Superdome) has suffered similar problems – high competition from a more centrally located rival and under-utilisation. This Arena is now owned by Nine Entertainment and managed by AEG, with naming rights sold to Acer.
Searle (2002) concluded that these legacy issues may only be resolved if the Olympic Park / Newington area can become a significant residential zone that will allow these facilities to compete with better located competitors. However, the location has not prevented smaller venues from being successful. The athletics centre is now a well used facility for junior sport and aquatics centre has become the nation’s second most visited sports venue. In 2002-3 it attracted over one million visitors with varying degrees of expertise (Cashman, 2006). The critical factor that determined the success of these two facilities was that they filled a gap in the city’s sporting infrastructure (Cashman, 2006).

In recent years, there has been a second building boom (2006-8) that has supplemented the sport facilities with commercial and residential development (Cashman, 2009). Several sports federations have moved to the Park – as have the annual Sydney Festival, the Easter Show and half the staff of the Commonwealth Bank. The lack of available land in Sydney is helping to attract new activity to the area (as are the good conference and exhibition facilities), but transport access remains awkward and the improvements required mean that Homebush Bay is still a drain on the public finances of the NSW State Government.

2.5.4 Key implications

• Sydney’s Games highlight that the delivery of venues and the event itself should not be at the expense of processes that guarantee transparency, local authority involvement and community input.

• Sydney’s Olympic Park shows that events can be used to remediate large areas of contaminated land – providing development opportunities in cities where land is in short supply.

• The late onset of legacy planning was a key problem. Staff needed to be working on legacy issues before the event took place. There was a lot of energy committed to the delivery of the Games, but the aftermath was less well considered (Lochhead (2005). Part of this effort should be devoted to planning how the regenerated area fits within a wider metropolitan strategy.

• As in Barcelona, the case demonstrates that host cities’ efforts to achieve positive housing legacies (in this case more sustainable housing) are hindered by financial constraints.

• The Sydney case also raised the issue of whether a site with a concentration of venues should be developed as a specialist destination, or as a conventional and multi-functional urban area.
2.6 The 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester

Summary of Manchester Commonwealth Games regeneration project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Manchester</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of event</td>
<td>Commonwealth Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year staged</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of physical changes</td>
<td>Eastlands (3km east of city centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former use of main site</td>
<td>Derelict, vacant, industrial site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main sport facilities</td>
<td>New stadium, regional athletics centre, velodrome, squash centre, tennis centre, Sports Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of main venues</td>
<td>£200million (Gratton et al., 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated regeneration</td>
<td>Wider project for ‘New East Manchester’, transport improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of associated regeneration</td>
<td>£470million (Gratton et al., 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.6.1 The context
Like Sheffield, Manchester suffered from de-industrialisation and physical decline in the 1970s and 1980s. At least 207,000 manufacturing jobs were lost in Greater Manchester between 1972 and 1984, and in 1986 unemployment levels reached 16% (Taylor et al., 1996). The eastern parts of the city were affected most and 20,000 jobs were lost in east Manchester between 1972 and 1984 (Misener and Mason, 2008). As part of regeneration efforts, Manchester submitted bids for the 1996 and 2000 Olympic Games. Rather than being perceived as failures, these bids are now regarded as responsible for genuine progress. They generated important intangible effects delivering a legacy of partnership working between public and private sectors allowing Manchester to address established image problems (Cochrane et al., 1996). Several related projects (e.g. a Velodrome and an Indoor Arena) were built anyway, providing some £75million worth of capital projects funded by central government. These facilities were influential when, in 1995, Manchester was confirmed as the host for the 2002 Commonwealth Games. Manchester’s Olympic credentials allowed it to defeat Sheffield’s rival bid – even through Sheffield had almost all the required facilities and was only a short distance away. The Commonwealth Games were seen as less prestigious than the Olympic Games, but Manchester felt they provided a good opportunity to lead the regeneration of the de-industrialised eastern fringes of the City. The Games strategy also fitted with city’s shift to a more entrepreneurial approach to urban development that sought to re-image Manchester as a European city, competing with Barcelona and Bonn, rather than Liverpool and Leeds.

2.6.2 Delivery mechanisms
The key motivation for hosting the Games was the need for a flagship project to stimulate sustainable regeneration in East Manchester. The City Council announced it would build a brand new 65,000 seat stadium – even though this was not a pre-requisite for staging the event. As Evans (2007) stated ‘the proposal to build a new stadium, which came about after the Commonwealth Games bid had been won, focused attention on the needs of East Manchester’. The Stadium cost £110million, most of which came from National Lottery funds, with the remainder contributed by the City Council. This stadium and several other venues were built on a former industrial site near to some of the most deprived districts in the UK; Beswick, Clayton and Openshaw. Other venues were developed in the city centre (Aquatics Centre) and in other parts of the North West (Bolton Arena).

Manchester City Council established a conventional event organising body to manage the Games project (M2002). However, the delivery mechanisms conceived were pioneering in that specific attention was devoted to legacy, Manchester’s efforts represented ‘the first time in Britain an ambitious legacy programme was designed around a major sport event’ (Gratton et al., 2005). In 1999 the Commonwealth Games Opportunities and Legacy Partnership Board was established to manage the legacy of the Games. In the same year, a Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) Programme featuring seven legacy projects was launched that was scheduled to run from 1999 to 2004. These projects were unusual in that they were focused on social and economic benefits rather than physical / environmental / property-led regeneration (Smith and Fox, 2007). The SRB scheme was also unusual in that it aimed to encourage regional effects that were not limited to those people living in close proximity to the main concentration of facilities (Smith and Fox, 2007). The main driving force behind the idea of a Games Legacy Scheme was the political will of Manchester City Council and Sport England to ensure that the 2002 Commonwealth Games were ‘more than 10 days of sport’ (Smith and Fox, 2007). Manchester wanted to leave a legacy of more than construction jobs and sporting facilities. There were advantages and disadvantages of using a parallel scheme funded by the SRB. Disadvantages included the artificial detachment of the scheme from the Games initiatives and the capital projects (Smith and Fox, 2007). This was the source of frustration amongst people who delivered the social and economic programme (Smith and Fox, 2007). However, Nichols and Ralston (2011) highlight that having a detached scheme – with a separate budget – meant that there was less chance that regeneration ambitions would be diluted if event costs exceeded original estimates. This is a noted characteristic of many event projects.

The whole project was led by Manchester City Council, with the assistance of other public sector agencies. Once elected in 1997, a new UK national government encouraged the Council’s efforts and there was also assistance from the North West [Regional] Development Agency (NWDA). The Games projects were delivered during a time when the institutional landscape in Britain was changing rapidly. In 1999, Richard Rogers’ Urban Task Force had urged the creation of more Urban Regeneration Companies and, in 2000; New East Manchester Ltd (NEM) was created. Urban Regeneration Companies were less powerful versions of Urban Development Corporations that did not have statutory powers. The East Manchester URC was a partnership between the City Council, NWDA and English Partnerships.
This partnership (limited by guarantee) helped to co-ordinate existing regeneration projects in the East Manchester area that were funded through national programmes (SRB, plus New Deal for Communities, Sure Start, Education, Health and Sport Action Zones). Although these projects were only indirectly related to the Commonwealth Games, they were prompted, boosted and given direction by the Games strategy (Ward, 2003). After the Games, NEM’s chief executive Tom Russell was recruited as the London Development Agency’s Legacy Director for the 2012 Olympic Games. This indicated that NEM’s work had been well received. Although regeneration in East Manchester was delivered using an innovative partnership approach to urban governance, this wasn’t an approach that ensured citizen empowerment (Blakeley, 2010). Community-wide engagement has only been implemented in Manchester since 2003, and so the Commonwealth Games strategy was delivered without proper community collaboration (Blakeley, 2010; Smith and Fox, 2007).

The Commonwealth Games site was integrated within wider plans for East Manchester that aimed to double the population to 60,000, build 12,500 new homes, create a 160 hectare business park and provide a new town centre (Greenhalgh and Gudgeon, 2004). Land for the main venues was assembled by the City Council (assisted by the NWDA and English Partnerships) before the formation of NEM. The site was developed incrementally, with a velodrome opening first; this venue was the tangible legacy of the Olympic Games bids in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Once the Commonwealth Games were secured, further facilities were built in East Manchester including the stadium, a subsidiary athletics arena, squash centre and tennis facility. Unlike previous host cities (e.g. Sheffield, Paris), the City Council was able to persuade a local football club, Manchester City, to move from their traditional ground to be the anchor tenant of the new stadium. A deal had to be struck to protect the interests of the Council who had part-funded a stadium that was sufficiently larger than the club’s previous home – and which therefore provided more potential for income generation. The club was given a 250 year lease with the proviso that it would guarantee community access and forward compensation when crowds exceeded those possible at the club’s previous ground. By 2005, £1.9 million had been generated through this arrangement and this money was reinvested in local sports development programmes (Manchester City Council, 2005).

### 2.6.3 Post-event

According to Ward (2003) the 2002 Commonwealth Games were generally perceived to be a success because of the efficient organisation, the number of spectators who attended and the general feel good factor they instilled. Residents seemed sceptical about the developments, but once it became clear that the Games were successful, the whole project was regarded more favourably.

The long term legacy is harder to judge. The original intention was to develop a new town centre at the edge of the city, with new retail provision and high value housing (Greenhalgh and Gudgeon, 2004). However, what has emerged is more like an out of town service city (Mace et al., 2007). The main concentration of facilities has been rebranded as SportCity. A new visitor centre has been installed and the site attracts a mixture of amateur sport enthusiasts and dedicated elite athletes. Attempts to turn the site into a genuine visitor destination have not been realised and a high profile sculpture (‘The B of the Bang’ by Thomas Heatherwick) was recently removed because of safety fears. The site is animated by the presence of Manchester City Football Club, but the recent takeover of the club by billionaire owners from Abu Dhabi means that some have questioned whether handing the stadium to Manchester City on a long term lease was the most appropriate strategy.

In terms of the wider legacy of the Games, the project to regenerate East Manchester has progressed. New housing has been developed, new employment has been created and Games associations have assisted other regeneration projects nearby. However, there are concerns that capital projects have merely ‘filled in the gaps’ in this area, rather than delivering a ‘genuine urban renaissance’ (Mace et al., 2007). The site has been developed further in recent years.
with the addition of homes (mainly flats for young professionals) and the development of a large supermarket on its periphery. Housing has sold well, but there are concerns about the demographically skewed community that is emerging there (it is dominated by young professionals).

In a similar manner to St. Denis, the presence of the stadium has also attracted new businesses and relocations because it symbolises progress. Local developers are quoted as stating ‘every time we have a prospective occupier, we take them to the stadium complex first and what it does is engender real confidence about East Manchester’s ability to deliver’ (Davies, 2006). Davies’s (2006) research suggested that the new stadium resulted in an 8% rise in the value of leisure property and that other (declining) property prices were stabilised. However, like in Sydney, the identity of the site remains unclear. It originally functioned as a specialist destination, but it is now emerging as a mixed use development. The evidence available suggests ‘New East Manchester’s future is surely as a much a destination as it is a residential location’ (Mace et al., 2007). There remain concerns about the legacy for local people living nearby. Mace et al. (2007) cited research that suggests residents are unlikely to benefit from either the SportCity site (too expensive) or the new supermarket (too big). Both seem more suited to those people within the wider region willing and able to travel to use these amenities.

In July 2011 the redevelopment of the site took a new direction. The new owners of Manchester City Football Club paid £20 million to Manchester City Council for the naming rights to the stadium. As part of the deal, the stadium and a reconfigured ‘Campus’ around the stadium will be renamed after the Club’s sponsors, Etihad. A new partnership between the Council, NEM and the owners of Manchester City Football Club announced plans to deliver educational facilities and other additions to East Manchester’s sports provision. Despite the changes to the organisations involved, the vision remains to transform East Manchester into a sports destination.

2.6.4 Key implications

- The Manchester case (in particular the SRB Programme) illustrates how events can be used as a coherent theme for social and economic regeneration initiatives and more diverse regeneration projects that are only indirectly linked to new venues.

- Event projects seem to work best when they are integrated with wider regeneration plans. Manchester’s Commonwealth Games projects were linked to several other regeneration programmes that have been pursued in East Manchester. However, deviating from Barcelona’s approach, the Manchester projects were perhaps led by event priorities, rather than by existing plans and long term objectives.

- The case shows how events can add to the institutional complexity and policy ‘thickness’ of urban regeneration.

- SportCity was developed successfully but the site is not socially and economically well integrated with local disadvantaged areas. There was a lack of community involvement in the planning and delivery of the project. This may mean that proposals may benefit new residents rather than existing ones.

- There is a need to provide a clear vision for an events site in the post-event era. The new plans announced by Manchester City FC, the Council and NEM may provide this. The SportCity site highlights the need to focus on delivering either a specialist destination zone or a new town centre /mixed use zone. Projects that fall somewhere between these directions may lead to unsuccessful place making.

- The case highlights the advantages of designating an anchor tenant for flagship venues before an event is staged. The conditions of the lease allowed public benefits to be realised (access and capital). However, it also highlights the issues associated with transferring ownership to private sector organisations.
2.0 A review of six previous case studies of event regeneration

2.7 The 2006 Commonwealth Games in Melbourne

Table 2.6 Summary of Melbourne’s Commonwealth Games regeneration project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Melbourne</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of event</td>
<td>Commonwealth Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year staged</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of physical changes</td>
<td>City centre, plus Albert Park (3km south of CBD) and Parkville (4km north of CBD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former use of main site</td>
<td>Existing sports venues. Former psychiatric institute (Parkville)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main sport facilities</td>
<td>Refurbishment of (and supplementary facilities added to) existing venues in the city. Main investments: redevelopment of MCG, Olympic Park Athletics Track, Melbourne Sports and Aquatic Centre, State netball and hockey centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of main venues</td>
<td>AUS$1.1 billion spent on staging the Games itself (Insight Economics, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated regeneration</td>
<td>Athletes’ Village. Series of other projects timed to be completed for Games including upgrade to Jolimont station, new footbridge over river, improvements to public parks (e.g. lighting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of associated regeneration</td>
<td>AUS$1.524 billion (including Athletes’ Village) (Insight Economics, 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 The UK Pound – Australian Dollar exchange rate during the period 2003-6 was approx £1 = $2.35-2.85
2.7.1 The context

Like Barcelona, Melbourne has a long history of using events to achieve strategic objectives. Melbourne hosted an Expo in 1880 and staged the 1956 Olympic Games to define and establish itself as a city with international credentials (Davison, 1997). In the 1970s, 30% of employment in the city was in the manufacturing sector – whereas currently it is nearer 10% (O’Hanlon, 2009). The population of the city was severely affected by the job losses and the number of residents remains below the level recorded in 1971 (O’Hanlon, 2009). In an effort to stem this cycle of decline, the State Government identified a cultural and sporting role for the city and immediately began to make related changes to Melbourne’s main venues. Additional capacity was added at Flemington Racecourse (home of the Melbourne Cup), lights were added to the Melbourne Cricket Ground which was also made the permanent host of the AFL Grand Final, and a new government funded facility was built at Flinders Park which was completed in 1988. This event-oriented policy fitted well with Victoria State Government’s philosophy in the 1990s and in that decade further improvements were made – a National Tennis Centre was opened (home to the Australian Open) and next door a new stadium was developed. This investment in event venues was supplemented with funds for a cultural events programme and Melbourne now stages an International Arts Festival, Comedy Festival and Flower and Garden Show. The Victoria Major Events Company was created to co-ordinate events projects and a bid was submitted to stage the 1996 Olympic Games. Therefore, the decision made by the Victoria Government in the 1990s to bid for the 2006 Commonwealth Games complemented the city’s existing image as an events city and they were keen to use the Games to promote Melbourne as the nation’s events capital. It also saw the Games as a mechanism to improve housing and transport provision, to emphasise the regenerated river zone and to assist social objectives (MCC, 2002).

2.7.2 Delivery mechanisms

Just as the 2000 Olympic Games project had been led by the NSW State Government, the 2006 Commonwealth Games project was led by the Victoria State Government. A Minister for the Games was appointed and the Government established a Corporation (M2006) to manage the event. A Coordination Office (OCGC) was established with the State Communities Department to deliver the Games on time and within a budget of $1.1billion and there was some partnership working with the National Government that provided resources to fund security and other expenses (Insight Economics, 2006). The major regeneration projects delivered included the redevelopment of a suburban site as the athletes’ village, the construction of some new venues and the redevelopment of others. The Games budget was seen as relatively frugal and the overall spending was less than that committed by Manchester four years previously (Insight Economics, 2006). Other urban infrastructure projects were also brought forward to coincide with the Games. It was estimated that 87% of spending on major projects went to local firms (Insight Economics, 2006).

The main physical change made to the city was the Games Village, a new housing project built on the site of a former psychiatric hospital. Various ‘non-market’ options were considered that were more in line with the athletes’ accommodation offered by Sheffield and Manchester including refurbishment of high rise estates, moored cruiseships, and other temporary villages (VAGO, 2005). However, despite the lack of a clear business case and a proper cost benefit analysis (VAGO, 2005), the decision was taken to pursue a development project in the suburb of Parkville.

In 2003 the Victorian Government entered into an agreement with a development consortium to build the Games Village as part of a larger mixed housing development. A master plan was agreed for the site, with the developers given the task of building and selling the homes with a share of the profits from private sales allocated to the State. Public consultation was undertaken March-June 2002 and a community liaison committee was established when building began (DVC, 2006). In the Melbourne City Plan (2002) the target was for 20-30% of units to be social housing and ultimately, a figure of 20% was agreed (VAGO, 2005). The State contribution was roughly AUS$50million for the construction of the Village and a further AUS$35million for the social housing which meant that – with other costs included – the final bill was AUS$160million (VAGO, 2005). The deal also involved the transfer of 12 hectares of publicly owned land, with the remaining 8 hectares of the site retained by the State for public space and social housing. However, there were problems noted by the audit report regarding the inaccurate valuation of land which made it difficult to assess the benefits of the deal struck (VAGO, 2005). The value of the land handed over to the developers had been
A review of six previous case studies of event regeneration

RICS Research – The 2012 Games: The regeneration legacy

2.0 Over-estimated resulting in an unexpected surplus of AUSS21million to absorb inevitable cost increases. Pre-event estimates suggest that the State Government should recoup around AUSS80 million from their share of private housing sales, as well as acquiring 200 new social housing units (VAGO, 2005).

In some ways this project was a conventional housing project delivered by a public-private partnership. However, there were issues caused by the designation of the site as the athletes’ accommodation for the 2006 Games. In 2004 the scope of the project changed because M2006 and the Commonwealth Games Federation expressed concerns about the quality of the Games Village – in particular the cramped conditions (VAGO, 2005). The necessary improvements meant the State had to commit about AUSS50 million of extra funds (VAGO, 2005), although some costs were offset because they merely brought forward site changes that would have had to take place anyway. The Games Village was transferred to M2006 in 2005 and returned to the developers six months later after the Games had finished. The subsequent government audit suggested that the overall net contribution of the State to the Games Village project was AUSS41 million (VAGO, 2005). This outlay allowed the State to meet its Games obligations and provide 200 long term social housing units for the community, including an old people’s home.

Other major investments were undertaken by the State Government. These were generally well managed and delivered on budget (Insight Economics, 2006). In addition to new and improved sports facilities, the Victorian Government funded improvements to Jolimont Station and a new bridge over the Yarra River. Where shared responsibility was involved, there tended to be more problems. For example, the National Government pulled out of an arrangement to co-fund improvements to the Melbourne Cricket Ground (Insight Economics, 2006). As in Sheffield, this meant the State Government had to commit more resources to the Games project than it originally intended. Misener and Mason (2008) estimated that the redevelopment of the MCG for the Games cost AUSS430 million.

There is evidence that the delivery of the 2006 Commonwealth Games was integrated into strategic urban planning. In the 2002 City Plan the Games Village was designated as an opportunity to achieve greater urban densities, thus contributing to the strategic objective of increasing the residential population of the city (MCC, 2002). The Games were also cited in this plan as a way to enhance transport provision, to promote Melbourne as an events city and as an economic opportunity to create new international links and relationships (MCC, 2002). It is also clear that the Games were viewed as a way to draw attention to Melbourne’s regenerated waterfronts and this helped to explain why ceremonies and cultural festivals were heavily focused on the Yarra River.

One of the more innovative aspects of Melbourne’s strategy was the aim to address social policy objectives ‘such as improving accessibility, diversity and community participation’ (Insight Economics, 2006). These aims were delivered through the ‘Equal First’ legacy plan which involved 5 key themes: diversity; an accessible event; inclusive employment, training and volunteering opportunities; connecting and celebrating culture; and active and inclusive communities (Kellett et al., 2008). To help achieve some of these ambitious objectives, an ‘adopt a team’ initiative was implemented where 79 municipalities were assigned one of the competing national teams. This was an innovative programme that built on the established practice of satellite areas hosting training camps. Like some of Manchester’s social projects, it capitalised on the international status of the event and the links with communities that had emigrated from different parts of the Commonwealth. Local authorities developed workshops, schools projects and events to forge links with their respective teams (Kellett et al. 2008). These projects were supported and inspired by M2006, but it was up to local authorities to ‘lever’ the benefits of this ‘opportunity’. Some of the more proactive councils adopted innovative initiatives that helped to improve relationships not only between local people, but between local government and schools. However, others did little more than to use the connections as a marketing opportunity (Kellett et al. 2008). As in Manchester, volunteering initiatives were also used to help achieve positive social and economic legacies. However, there were some issues with the organisation of the programme (Lockstone and Baum, 2009) and there was less effort to engage disadvantaged individuals than in Manchester.
2.7.3 Post-event

It is too soon to judge the long term implications of the 2006 Commonwealth Games, but preliminary assessments seem positive. The Triple Bottom-Line Assessment (Insight Economics, 2006: xvii) concluded that ‘Victorians were positive about the Games and felt that through them Victoria’s strengths had been showcased effectively’. The Games were delivered in a highly organised manner and within the (relatively small) budget originally envisaged and all of the objectives of the State Government were achieved (Insight Economics, 2006), although the regeneration ambitions were relatively modest compared to other events. The capacity of the city to stage major events in the future has been improved and the Games have reinforced the image of the city as an events capital. Melbourne now attracts 230,000 international events visitors each year (42% of the national total) (O’Hanlon, 2009) and the popularity of events and the impressive events calendar developed reduces the risk that new venues will be under-used. The Games Village is still being redeveloped until 2015, but its attractive location and good integration into the city should mean that the developers and, therefore, the State, are likely to recoup much of their investment. The provision of social housing and public space within these plans should ensure that there is a social legacy and wider urban development projects were brought forward to coincide with the Games and these should leave a positive economic legacy. Melbourne’s centre has been regenerated, but major problems remain in outer lying districts and the Games have done little to assist these areas but there is a possibility that some of the investment in non-capital projects will help people outside the centre. The Triple Bottom-Line assessment of the Games cited a significant social impact and more than half the volunteers involved stated they want to keep volunteering (Insight Economics, 2006).

2.7.4 Key implications

• The Melbourne case suggests it is possible to use events to assist the delivery of social housing that is affordable for both residents and governments, especially when these units are subsidised by lucrative wider real estate projects.

• Furthermore, the case emphasises that in negotiations with private sector developers to deliver Games Village projects it is important (though difficult) to include realistic estimates for any land to be transferred.

• The Melbourne case shows that in major cities that already have established events facilities, it is possible to place greater emphasis on socio-economic projects and less on venue developments.

• The case highlights that with international events which involve international competitors there are opportunities to deal with issues regarding opportunities for migrants and their integration and acceptance.

• The city used the Games to showcase recently completed regeneration projects in the river zone. This highlights how events can be used at the end of the regeneration process, as well as at initial and interim stages.
2.8 Output 1: Good practice criteria

The lessons learned from the 6 case studies analysed have been consolidated to produce a set of good practice criteria (see Table 2.7). These are designed as principles to guide cities attempting urban regeneration via a major event. The purpose of the criteria is not to advocate these practices for all host cities, but merely to make recommendations for those pursuing regeneration objectives. All the points are important, but points 1, 2, 9, 10 and 11 (shaded purple in Table 2.7) are particularly influential in ensuring the physical regeneration of urban areas. Accordingly, these are weighted double when the criteria are used to assess event regeneration projects.

### Table 2.7 The good practice criteria emanating from the review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional framework</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Major events can best assist regeneration efforts when they are organised by a consortium of municipal, regional and national agencies, not merely municipalities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. The institutional framework needs to allow regeneration of event sites to be integrated within broader urban regeneration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. An organisation dedicated to legacy issues – whose life extends before and after duration of the event – needs to be established.</td>
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<td>4. There is a need to ensure that when public assets are privatised, or the private sector becomes more involved, measures are introduced to secure public interests and wider outcomes.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources and budgets</th>
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<tr>
<td>5. At the early stages of event projects, there needs to be more realism about cost overruns and revenue / benefit shortfalls.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Measures need to be put in place to ensure regeneration outcomes are not compromised when there is pressure to balance event budgets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Changes in real estate values generated by event projects should be used to offset costs. More innovative ways of funding event projects should be explored.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Sufficient human and capital resources need to be committed throughout the lifetime of event regeneration projects to achieve sustained effects.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Priorities for delivery agencies</th>
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<tr>
<td>9. Events achieve the best outcomes when they are used to accelerate, extend or revive existing urban regeneration projects.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. There needs to be more emphasis on (long term) event regeneration and less on (short term) event management priorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Extra effort needs to be made to integrate events sites with existing populations, physically; but also socially and economically.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Parallel regeneration initiatives and more diverse regeneration projects are required that are not reliant on event projects.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. The efficient delivery of venues and associated regeneration projects should not be at the expense of processes that guarantee transparency, democratic accountability and community input.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Decisions need to be made as to whether event sites should be regenerated as specialist destinations, or as a conventional / multi-functional urban areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. The choice of site is crucial – ideally, it should be one where suppressed potential can be unlocked.</td>
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2.9 Output 2: Delivery models

Two models regarding delivery approaches have also been developed from the six cases analysed: one that focuses on the configuration of stakeholders; and another that highlights different ways that events are incorporated into regeneration programmes. These conceptualisations are combined in Figure 2.1.

2.9.1 Institutional configuration

The approaches used in the cases discussed previously suggest there are three main ways of delivering event regeneration. These are outlined below:

The municipal approach

The most basic way of delivering event regeneration is for the local public sector to take on the key responsibilities and work with event organisers to deliver wider legacies. This approach has the advantage of more democratic accountability as local citizens / businesses can be asked whether they are willing to fund related projects. However, as Sheffield and Melbourne discovered, a municipal approach adds to the financial risks involved (Sheffield) and limits the scale of what can be achieved (Melbourne).

The multi-level governance approach

In several of the examples analysed (e.g. Barcelona, Paris, Manchester) regeneration outcomes were achieved because the event attracted national/regional public sector agencies and finances. Agencies responsible for wider territories worked with local authorities to implement programmes. In Paris, the collaboration between local institutions, and the involvement of regional and national governments provided evidence of both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of multi-level governance. Mega-events are often pursued as national projects even when there is one primary host location, and this provides opportunities for disadvantaged areas to lever national regeneration funding. Funding and involvement from national government also provides extra assurances for private investors considering investing in these areas. Thus, national involvement is often justified through envisaged subsequent private investment. However, the risk with a multi-governance approach is that local agencies are disempowered.

The public-private partnership approach

In some of the cases analysed, there was an attempt to encourage the private sector to take on the responsibility for funding some facilities that have commercial potential (particularly housing). On a more general level, the private sector may benefit from some of the outcomes of event regeneration; and therefore they should shoulder some of the costs / risk. Accordingly, some mega-event projects involve partnerships between public and private institutions. This approach also enables private sector expertise, as well as private sector funds, to be utilised. In public-private partnerships, the public sector often acts in a masterplanning capacity: overseeing the wider project and / or acting as a guarantor. In the examples analysed here, more private sector involvement was often envisaged, but never materialised (Sydney). There was also evidence that there were advantages of retaining some public ownership of event projects to ensure public interest is served / to secure returns for public agencies.

2.9.2 The way in which the event is used within regeneration efforts

As well as exemplifying different institutional delivery models, the examples reviewed vary according to the way events were used in urban regeneration. This variance can be linked to the stage that events were used: at the preliminary, intermediary or closing stages of wider urban regeneration projects.

Preliminary stages: ‘Event as flagship’ approach

In the context of urban regeneration, the term flagship is used for anchor projects that act as a ‘marshalling point for further investment’ (Smyth, 1994). Accordingly, events are sometimes used to stimulate urban regeneration in areas where there seems little chance of market led renewal. Staging an event is seen as the one way to generate interest, and confidence, in these areas. In Plaine St. Denis (Paris), evidence suggests this area needed the stadium/event to instigate regeneration. Similarly in Sheffield, the WSG projects were meant to act as a flagship for regeneration in an area where there was urgent need for new investment, but little hope this would happen organically.
Intermediary stages: ‘Event as lever’ approach
Some of the best outcomes appear to occur in instances where events are used to assist existing regeneration efforts. Where good plans already exist for an area, events can provide a lever to extend or accelerate these efforts, or to help ensure delivery of projects where there is doubt that sufficient progress will be made. Barcelona is the best example of this type of approach. In these instances, urban regeneration and development would have taken place anyway – albeit at a smaller scale or slower pace.

Concluding stages: ‘Event as showcase’ approach
The most recent of the examples identified provides a good illustration of the way events can be used to highlight projects that are complete, or nearing completion. Melbourne has been redeveloping its riverfront for many years, and the 2006 Commonwealth Games allowed these changes to be communicated to a wider audience. This allowed event regeneration efforts to focus on ‘softer’ social and economic projects.

2.9.3 Combining the two approaches and locating the cases
Figure 2.1 locates the six cases on a graph according to their position with respect to the two key variables discussed above: the range of stakeholders involved; and the stage at which event is used. This produces a matrix of 9 cells. Of these, the upper middle cell is deemed to represent the strategic approach that offers the best chance of success. This cell is shaded purple on the diagram (see Figure 2.1). Cases located in the purple zone involve a wide range of public sector agencies representing different scales and private sector stakeholders. This position would also indicate a project that is used to assist an existing regeneration project; either to extend, accelerate or recharge it. None of the cases analysed here match this profile; although the projects in Barcelona and Manchester come nearest. These event projects were deployed an appropriate point in a wider regeneration programme and involved public sector agencies at different scales, but relied too heavily on public sector financing.
2.9.4 Using these outputs

In the next section of the report, the two main outputs of this section (the set of criteria and model of delivery approaches) will be applied to the London 2012 project. This will allow London’s regeneration legacy planning to be evaluated.
This section of the report applies the lessons learned from the previous cases to London. Documentary analysis and interviews with those involved in the project have been used as the basis for the analysis. The regeneration legacy planning for London 2012 is evaluated with reference to the good practice criteria and the delivery model outlined at the end of Section 2. There are two important observations to consider when applying these ideas. The first is that the project to transform East London using the 2012 Games is incomplete and it will be some time before any full evaluations can be undertaken. Second, the London project is unique in many ways, and therefore generic evaluation criteria are not always applicable. However, there are enough similarities to justify this analysis, and the application of the criteria/model helps to evaluate the project as it stands one year before the Games begin.

### Table 3.1: Summary of East London’s Olympic Games regeneration project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>London</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of event</td>
<td>Olympic and Paralympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year staged</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site of physical changes</td>
<td>Stratford (10km east of city centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former use of main site</td>
<td>Former industrial and recreational site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main sport facilities</td>
<td>Stadium, aquatics centre, velodrome, handball arena, hockey stadium, basketball stadium (temporary), BMX track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of main venues</td>
<td>£1.164 billion (DCMS, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated regeneration</td>
<td>Remediation of large site, provision of parklands, transport improvements, media centres and new housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of associated regeneration</td>
<td>Total anticipated cost of £4.987 billion, £1.928 billion (site preparation and infrastructure), £865 million (transport), £993 million (parkwide projects), £1.201 billion (media centre and athletes village) (DCMS, 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1 Institutional framework

1. Major events can best assist regeneration efforts when they are organised by a consortium of municipal, regional and national agencies, not merely municipalities.

East London’s Olympic transformation has received substantial and consistent backing from national government, Greater London agencies and London Boroughs. Despite new administrations at the London (2008) and national levels (2010), commitments of previous incumbents have been honoured. Agencies at the city level and national level have worked with Host Boroughs to plan and deliver the associated regeneration. Host Boroughs have remained firmly supportive of the project, although relations between Boroughs (and between Boroughs and other agencies) have not always been harmonious. The range of government agencies involved in, and committed to, the project remains a key strength. However, there is some concern among agencies involved that the number of different organisations may make it more difficult to achieve the successful transformation of East London.

Score: 18/20

2. The institutional framework needs to allow regeneration of event sites to be integrated within broader urban regeneration.

Agencies responsible for East London’s Olympic transformation tend to be dedicated to one of the two main priorities: the development of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park (e.g. work of ODA, OPLC), and the wider regeneration of East London (ELLB and incumbent stakeholders). This facilitates broader regeneration, but there seems to be less emphasis on the latter, and there could be better integration between the two. The challenge is to ensure that regeneration extends even further into other parts of East London. This will be guided generally by the London Plan and more specifically by the Legacy Master plan for the Olympic Park (due autumn 2011) and Olympic Legacy Supplementary Planning Guidance (also due to be published in 2011). The proposed creation of a Mayoral Development Corporation (MDC) from 2012 with larger boundaries than the Olympic Park should help to extend transformation westwards into Hackney Wick and Fish Island; and southwards into Three Mills. Details of the powers and boundaries of the MDC should be confirmed in autumn 2011. However, in a period when there are significant constraints on public spending, the new MDC is likely to be focused on the transformation of the Park and opportunities to link the Park to other projects in East London may be missed. Plans in the original bid to ‘benefit the community through regeneration’ are also articulated in the Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF). This ambitious programme aims to improve opportunities and conditions for residents of the Host Olympic Boroughs so that they are in a median position compared to other London Boroughs with respect to key socio-economic indicators. The East London Legacy Board (ELLB) co-ordinates the activities of the multiple agencies involved. However, there are doubts about if and how ‘convergence’ between Olympic Boroughs and other Boroughs can be achieved.

Score: 17/20

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5 Interview with LDA.  6 Interview with East Thames; LDA; ODA.  7 Hereafter referred to as the Olympic Park.  8 Interview with LBH; East Thames; LDA
3. An organisation dedicated to legacy issues – whose life extends before and after duration of the event – needs to be established.

London’s dedicated legacy agency (OPLC) was established in 2009. Setting up this agency three years before the event represents a significant improvement on arrangements in previous hosts (e.g. Sydney) where legacy agencies were only established after the event had taken place. London 2012 legacy responsibilities (and associated plans) shifted during the period 2006-9 and there were some complaints about delays setting up the OPLC. However, those involved in the project do not think this has affected the likelihood of success. The creation of the OPLC has been welcomed by a range of delivery agencies.

The current Mayor of London has said that he established the OPLC because of his ‘strong desire to have a single organisation responsible and accountable for securing the best possible legacy for the Olympic Park’. The proposed evolution of the OPLC into a MDC should mean that this focused approach continues post 2012. The ELLB (also established in 2009) provides the co-ordination for wider legacy efforts outside the Olympic Park. Original members included a large number of public agencies. In 2010 its membership was narrowed and the Greater London Authority took over the chair from DCLG. This organisation is merely a forum for collaboration, rather than a delivery agency, but – if properly supported – it could play a pivotal role in co-ordinating wider objectives articulated in the SRF.

Score: 9/10

4. There is a need to ensure that when public assets are privatised, or the private sector becomes more involved, measures are introduced to secure public interests and wider outcomes.

Public interests are protected generally via the involvement of elected agencies and more specifically through contractual obligations and ‘planning gain’ mechanisms such as Section 106 agreements (from 2014 Community Infrastructure Levy). These are stipulated within planning permissions and cover a range of conditions from environmental performance to the provision of affordable housing. Commitments will need to be monitored and enforced effectively and there is likely to be pressure to sell off assets to repay costs incurred by public agencies and this could affect legacy outcomes. Privatising venues would help to generate financial returns, but it could challenge the social legacy. The latest indication from the OPLC is that they favour leasing venues: ‘Under a lease agreement, the asset remains with the public sector but the associated ongoing operational risk resides with the private sector’ (OPLC, 2010b). A key issue is the accessibility of the venues, and related stipulations need to be included when management arrangements are negotiated.

Score: 8/10

9 Interview with LBN. 10 Interview with OPLC. 11 Interviews with East Thames; LBN. 12 Interview with OPLC. 13 Interview with OPLC.
3.2 Resources and budgets

5. At the early stages of event projects, there needs to be more realism about cost overruns and revenue / benefit shortfalls.

This is the major criticism of the London project. The original decision to bid for the Games and to use them to transform East London was not based on a full appreciation of the costs involved. Some in government did not expect to win the Games meaning the figures in the original budget were only rough calculations. The scale of the project and levels of progress are impressive, but it has cost a lot of money. The anticipated final cost of the ODA’s work is £7.250 billion (DCMS, 2011). The revised budget and the associated legacy rhetoric have raised expectations14. Funds have come from a variety of sources, including national government (67%), National Lottery funds (23%), and local government (10%) (DCMS, 2011). Contingency funds were set aside in the revised budget, and were required soon after because private sector contributions (e.g. towards the costs of the Olympic Village) were less than envisaged. London 2012 organisers could not have envisaged the severity of the global economic crisis. However, during the debates regarding whether London should bid for the Games there was some anticipation of likely problems. In 2003 a Parliamentary Committee reported that the UK Government had to prove that a privately developed village was realisable and deliverable between 2005-12 (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2003). Since difficult decisions were taken to increase the budget (2007), and to use contingency funds (2008), the budget seems to have been kept under control. Indeed, it was recently announced that the ODA’s work would be delivered ‘under budget’ as it had made savings of £870 million since the 2007 funding package was announced (DCMS, 2011).

Score: 6/10

6. Measures need to be put in place to ensure regeneration outcomes are not compromised when there is pressure to balance event budgets.

There have been admirable attempts to protect Olympic legacy ambitions from financial pressures. The agreement to transfer land from the LDA to the OPLC free of associated debt and the £500 million of extra funding provided to convert the Olympic Park are good examples15. Ambitions have not been downgraded despite the global economic crisis and recent policies such as the SRF arguably represent a scaling up of ambitions16. Some regeneration aspirations are inevitably being challenged because of budget pressures but the physical transformation agenda has suffered less than other aspects of the London 2012 project. Key stakeholders involved have urged the OPLC to resist pressure to secure short term financial returns17. This applies to housing provision, but also to the International Broadcast Centre (IBC), Media and Press Centre (MPC) and arrangements for venues. The London Borough of Newham (2010) warned that; ‘It is vital that potential budget cuts, or the pressing needs of the Games themselves, do not put at risk legacy transformation budgets, and the long term success of the Olympic Park’.

Score: 9/10

14 Interview with First Base. 15 Interview with LBH. 16 Interview with OPLC. 17 Interview with LBH.
7. Changes in real estate values generated by event projects should be used to offset costs. More innovative ways of funding event projects should be explored.

This principle was adopted at an early stage, but land assembly was more expensive than envisaged and market conditions have changed which means the chances of achieving high returns from asset sales have receded. Agencies involved suggested that waiting for prices to rise gives the best chance of securing maximum value from the sale of assets. However, there may be pressure to sell these sooner rather than later (see #6 above). The project has been funded using more public finance than was originally envisaged, and although this has been controversial, the agencies involved felt that this decision was the right one because market conditions meant alternative approaches were unviable. Now the challenge is to achieve legacy ambitions and to recoup funds via asset sales. The London Assembly have expressed concern that the OPLC have insufficient incentives to secure value for money from the land they inherited free of debt. Innovative funding mechanisms (Tax Increment Financing, Business Improvement Districts) have been proposed to fund the legacy phase, but they have not been used in the project so far. However, these mechanisms may help to fund the conversion of the Park. The Development Director of Westfield Stratford City (a key stakeholder) has suggested that ‘Provided initial funding can be identified then it seems reasonable that some sort of percentage of the receipts are allocated for this purpose or that some form of tax incremental finance funding be available to the Park operators.’ Market conditions are the main obstacle that may restrict the viability of these mechanisms.

Score: 7/10

8. Sufficient human and capital resources need to be committed throughout the lifetime of event regeneration projects to achieve sustained effects.

Legacy projects for London 2012 were conceived and implemented early with resources committed to securing positive effects from the pre-event period as well as post-event (e.g. employment initiatives). Funding for the post-event phase has now been promised. Despite some high profile departures (from the ODA) in 2006 and (from the LDA) in 2009, there has been good retention of key personnel throughout the lifetime of the project. As the project has evolved, staff previously involved in East London regeneration or other Olympic agencies have been employed by new organisations and staff members have also moved between delivery agencies. However, it might have been preferable for more continuity between the people involved in the delivery and those involved in the bid. It is vital that key staff members are retained post-2012 to implement the legacy phase and there needs to be a smooth transition to the MDC when the ODA and OPLC expire to ensure that momentum is retained after the event. The Mayor of London has proposed that OPLC Board members will be on the Board of the new MDC and this should ensure some continuity (Mayor of London, 2011) but the new MDC needs to be in place before the event to ensure that momentum is retained in the immediate post-event period.

Score: 9/10
### 3.3 Priorities for delivery agencies

#### 9. Events achieve the best outcomes when they are used to accelerate, extend or revive existing urban regeneration projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LONDON 2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 2012 Games have been used to accelerate and extend existing plans for East London in general and Stratford in particular. The project to regenerate Stratford predates the Olympics, and the core elements from established proposals remain part of the project (e.g. Stratford City, Stratford International). Since 2004, the various iterations of the London Plan have identified East London as the zone that will facilitate London's growth and the Games projects have helped to accelerate this long term objective. Early in the project, plans were amended to ensure a better fit with proposals for Stratford City and Hackney Wick. The Olympic Park project has extended the scale and scope of regeneration, but Stratford City, the High Speed Rail Link and other transport improvements remain integral. The Westfield shopping centre and Stratford City project are expected to generate as many jobs and homes as the Olympic Park and the Olympic project has helped to support these projects that pre-date the Olympics. Maintaining 2012 Games aspirations has helped to protect these wider projects from the effects of the global economic crisis and this represents an important part of the Games’ legacy. The London Plan, the OPLC's Legacy Master plan, Olympic Legacy Supplementary Planning Guidance and the Local Development Frameworks of the Boroughs are the mechanisms that will ensure that post-event developments fit with long term aspirations.</td>
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Score: **18/20**

#### 10. There needs to be more emphasis on (long term) event regeneration and less on (short term) event management priorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LONDON 2012</th>
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<tr>
<td>Staging the 2012 Games is a complex and high profile project and it is understandable that resources have been concentrated on getting delivery of the event right. The poor delivery performance of similar London projects in the period 1995-2005 (e.g. Wembley, Picketts Lock) meant agencies have been keen to prove that the UK can undertake projects on this scale. Legacy considerations have been taken seriously since the start of the project and some changes have been made because of these considerations. For example, the main venues (Aquatics Centre and Stadium) were designed to be adapted in legacy mode. Recent reports on event delivery progress have been very positive (DCMS, 2011; NAO, 2011), but there have been several reports that question progress on legacy matters (London Assembly, 2010a; 2010b). This suggests the balance is still tilted towards event delivery. However, London has been commended for devoting more attention to legacy considerations than previous host cities. A recent OECD (2010) report concluded that: ’although many cities have achieved a significant legacy, and several have planned actively in advance to achieve it, few cities will have prepared for it as directly and consciously as London has’. Completing venues on time means that even more attention can now be given to post-event planning.</td>
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Score: **16/20**

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24 Interview with First Base. 25 Interview with ODA. 26 Interviews with East Thames; LDA.
11. Extra effort needs to be made to integrate events sites with existing populations, physically; but also socially and economically.

The OPLC wants the Olympic Park to be ‘a catalyst for the regeneration of East London by ensuring the site is physically, economically and socially interconnected with the surrounding communities and that local communities are fully engaged’. Many of the agencies interviewed agreed that integration was a critical success factor for the project. However, there are concerns about whether integration will be achieved, leading to fears that the Olympic Park will become an island of regeneration as physical links are obstructed by the geography of the site. Economically, there are some links between projects and Olympic fringes. The new location of the IPC and the MBC fits with Hackney’s vision for a creative industries hub; and retail provision at Stratford City corresponds with plans to turn the southern part of the Park into a commercial site and visitor destination. There have been initiatives to allow local people to access retail jobs (The Skills Place) and targets regarding local employment during the construction phase have largely been met. However, plans for new jobs remain very vague so it is hard to gauge whether they will be accessible to local people. Social integration will also depend on levels of access to the venues. The Mayor of London has stated that these should be accessible community facilities, but doubts remain about the suitability of the venues for community use (London Assembly, 2010a).

Score: 7/10

12. Parallel regeneration initiatives and more diverse regeneration projects are required that are not reliant on event projects.

Parallel social and economic projects have been developed in association with London 2012. Organisers and delivery agencies appreciate that the Games can be used to theme wider projects and there have been several employment and skills initiatives. These include links to skills agencies (National Skills Academies for Construction / Sport and Active Leisure) opportunities for specialised training (London 2012 Apprentice Programme; Women in Construction), pre-employment schemes (LDA Opportunities Fund), educational programmes (Get Set), various pre-volunteering initiatives (e.g. Personal Best) and schemes to encourage a greater range of suppliers to benefit (CompeteFor). These have been co-ordinated by LOCOG, the ODA, the LDA, Host Boroughs and third sector agencies. The ‘Inspire’ mark has been created to allow a more diverse range of projects to use Olympic connections without contravening strict copyright restrictions. The SRF provides the framework in which wider social ambitions for Host Boroughs are articulated. This ambitious programme is linked to the 2012 Games but, ultimately, it uses the Games as a timely opportunity to improve employment, housing, health and education provision (rather than as the driver of that change). This fits with the notion of event-themed regeneration (Smith and Fox, 2007).

Score: 9/10

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27 Interviews with ODA; OPLC; LBN; LBH; First Base. 28 Interview with OPLC. 29 Interview with LBN. 30 Interview with DCLG.
13. The efficient delivery of venues and associated regeneration projects should not be at the expense of processes that guarantee transparency, democratic accountability and community input.

Generally, the project has managed to avoid the problems observed in Sydney where projects were sanctioned using special mechanisms designed to ease the progress of Olympic projects through the planning system (Owen, 2002). The original planning applications for the Olympic Park were sanctioned by the Host Boroughs via a special Joint Planning Authorities Team. Public consultation is more difficult where there are strict deadlines, but Olympic delivery agencies have attempted to engage the public. Public consultations have taken place, events have been staged (e.g. Legacy Now, OPLC Lecture Series) and a project has been set up by LOCOG to allow the public to suggest their own Olympic regeneration projects at the micro scale (Changing Places). Transparency has been achieved via the regular production and dissemination of reports. The involvement of Host Boroughs has assisted democratic accountability35. Nevertheless, delivery agencies like the ODA (and the proposed Mayoral Development Corporation) do override Host Boroughs’ planning procedures and collaboration with Host Boroughs could have been more extensive36. More could always be done to try and give people a greater say over the direction of these types of projects, but London’s efforts compare favourably with event projects of the past.

Score: 8/10

14. Decisions need to be made as to whether event sites should be regenerated as specialist destinations, or as a conventional / multi-functional urban areas.

The legacy vision for the Olympic Park fluctuated in the period 2005-933. The new OPLC vision suggests that the south of the site will be a visitor destination zone and the north will be a more conventional London neighbourhood (OPLC, 2010a). Despite the introduction of the AncelorMittal Orbit viewing tower, there are doubts about whether the south of the site can become a popular visitor destination and the OPLC’s (2010a) target for it to be one of London’s top 5 visitor destinations by 2020 seems optimistic. There are worries that not enough marketing and economic development work has been undertaken to assist the launch of ‘new’ East London34. If this part of London is to succeed as a destination and / or commercial site there need to be a stronger attempt to form an overarching and appealing place image35. The inclusion of suburban residential zones in the north of the Olympic Park represents a significant change from the original vision for extensive parklands and there seems to be some confusion about whether the Olympic Park is meant to become a typical London neighbourhood or a spectacular visitor destination36. Contradicting the destination ambitions, those involved in the project suggest that the aim is to create a new ‘piece’ of the city that is exhibits the urban qualities of other parts of the capital37.

Score: 7/10

31 Interview with LBH. 32 Interview with LBN. 33 Interviews with East Thames; ODA; LBN. 34 Interview with DCLG. 35 Interview with OPLC. 36 Interview with OPLC. 37 Interviews with ODA; OPLC.
15. The choice of site is crucial – ideally, it should be one where suppressed potential can be unlocked.

Delivery agencies are confident about the site – it has been chosen well\(^{38}\), assembled efficiently\(^{39}\) and is in a location that offers the potential for successful residential development\(^{40}\). The transport improvements associated with the site mean it will soon become one of the UK’s best connected sites outside central London. Other regeneration efforts were already underway here – allowing the Olympic Park to link with existing projects nearby (Stratford City) and those slightly further afield (e.g. Royal Docks, Greenwich Peninsula). The former Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, is credited with driving through the idea to concentrate venues in East London and this now seems like a sound decision. It helped London to win the bid, fitted with London’s spatial plans, helped to remediate a contaminated site and provided a framework within which to help disadvantaged people.

Score: 10/10

3.4 Overall assessment against the criteria

Overall, legacy planning attached to the London 2012 project performs well against the good practice criteria (see Table 3.2). The Games legacy has been planned carefully: hundreds of documents have been produced to guide development and the project has evolved considerably. Regeneration legacy planning has been addressed more convincingly and earlier than in most previous cases, allowing proposals to be debated and prepared properly.

Multiple initiatives have been launched to supplement physical projects with those that encompass a broader vision of regeneration. The 2012 Games regeneration legacy still a work in progress and there are several issues that need to be addressed as preparations continue. These include the integration of the Olympic Park with surrounding areas, the need for more emphasis on regeneration projects that will benefit East London more widely and a clearer plan for the transformation of the Park post-event. Funding remains a critical issue: and although Government commitment has so far been unequivocal, faith may be tested if there are further unanticipated costs.

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\(^{38}\) Interview with DCLG.  \(^{39}\) Interview with ODA.  \(^{40}\) Interviews with First Base; East Thames.
### Table 3.2 An assessment of the London 2012 project

#### Institutional framework

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<table>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Measures need to be put in place to ensure regeneration outcomes are not compromised when there is pressure to balance event budgets.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Changes in real estate values generated by event projects should be used to offset costs. More innovative ways of funding event projects should be explored.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Sufficient human and capital resources need to be committed throughout the lifetime of event regeneration projects to achieve sustained effects.</td>
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#### Priorities for delivery agencies

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<td>The choice of site is crucial – ideally, it should be one where suppressed potential can be unlocked.</td>
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**TOTAL SCORE (out of 200)** 165
3.5 London and the delivery models

It is also possible to locate the emerging case of London 2012 on the model representing delivery options outlined at the end of Section 2. The way that London 2012 builds on and integrates with long-established projects and plans for Stratford means it performs well against the criterion regarding the stage at which the event is being used in regeneration (see table 3.2). A broad range of agencies is involved with different geographical scales represented (Host Boroughs, Greater London, the UK Government – see table 3.2). The original plan was to attract more private sector funding, but these plans have had to be rethought because of the global economic crisis (see table 3.2). This means London does not enter the ideal zone on the matrix (Figure 3.1). However, Figure 3.1 also highlights that London is in a good position compared to previous host cities.

![Figure 3.1](Locating London 2012 on a matrix of delivery models. The purple zone represents the optimal scenario.)
Previous sections of this report highlight that the UK Government and London agencies have learned lessons from previous event projects and strenuous efforts have been made to optimise the chances of achieving a positive regeneration legacy from the 2012 Games. London’s legacy planning has performed well against the criteria set out in preceding sections. This means that the 2012 project seems to be in a good position compared to previous examples of event regeneration.

Particular examples of good practice noted include:

- The choice of a site that provided good opportunities for regeneration
- The early onset of legacy planning
- Involving a wide range of different stakeholders
- Unequivocal support from the UK Government
- Building on long term plans for London and existing regeneration projects
- The expression of aspirations for the wider area beyond the Olympic Park
- Attention to social and economic regeneration, as well as physical transformation

Successive administrations at the local, regional and national levels have backed the project and organisations such as the LDA, ODA and OPLC have been praised for their initiatives and ideas. The difficulty of the task they have taken on should not be underestimated. Transforming the heart of East London and achieving convergence between the Host Boroughs and other London Boroughs are ambitious aspirations. Agencies responsible for delivering on these aims have undertaken their work in a period of unprecedented economic uncertainty. This meant that funds anticipated from private sector organisations were not forthcoming. It is creditable that regeneration aspirations have not been downgraded in this difficult economic context. However, work thus far has relied on a generous public sector funding package and this means high expectations of public benefits and detailed scrutiny of outcomes.

Previous event projects and other regeneration projects on this scale have not generally delivered optimal outcomes and despite the effective management of this project, long term success is not guaranteed. However, the organisers of London 2012 have given themselves a platform from which a positive legacy could be attained. This represents a significant achievement, particularly compared to other event regeneration projects.

### 4.1 Critical success factors

General recommendations for event regeneration have already been communicated in this report via the good practice criteria and optimal delivery options outlined at the end of Section 2. With direct reference to the 2012 Games, it is rather late in this project’s lifetime to make specific recommendations about what should happen now. It is also an unhelpful time to suggest what could have been done differently. A more useful contribution is to point to factors that may ultimately determine the project’s long term success. These critical success factors indicate priorities for subsequent phases of the project.

According to the findings of this report, the success of aspirations to use London 2012 ‘to transform the heart of East London’ will ultimately depend on:

- Delivering regeneration in East London generally, rather than merely transforming the Olympic Park. The heart of East London has already been transformed physically by the ODA’s work. The London 2012 project will ultimately be judged on whether it benefits a broader geographical area. Stakeholders seem confident about the long term future for the Park, but they are less sure whether East London will be transformed post 2012.
- Generating future capital investment in the Olympic Park. Ideally, this should be from the private sector and innovative ways of funding future transformation should be explored. Any further public investment should be dedicated to key priorities e.g. integrating the Park at its fringes and providing parallel social and economic initiatives in areas outside the Park.
- Encouraging patient and sustained commitment. The wider regeneration benefits are likely to arise over a longer timeframe (20+ years) and this may test the patience of stakeholders. There is a great deal of pressure to restrict further public spending and after events are staged momentum is often lost. As so much investment has already been committed it is essential that long term aspirations are maintained.
- Maximising the value of the public’s stake in the Olympic Park. A balance needs to be struck between recouping costs and delivering social benefits. This is a long term regeneration project and it may be compromised by privatising too many of the assets; by allocating them to the wrong end-users; or by selling them at the wrong time. However, funds do need to be generated to repay costs incurred.
- Producing and delivering proposals to allow social and economic development to be derived from the physical regeneration of East London. Innumerable plans and policy documents have been produced in conjunction with the London 2012 project. However, at the time of writing some of the most important plans have not been published. These include: economic development and marketing strategies for East London; and an action plan to deliver the objectives contained in the SRF.
4.2 Recommendations for future research

The Government Olympic Executive is currently coordinating various evaluations of the 2012 Games. The overall performance of the regeneration dimension will not be known for some time and this has to be recognised in the timing of post-event evaluations. There are two approaches to evaluation: one that tries to assess the value added to East London's transformation by staging the 2012 Games; and a simpler approach that assesses the Olympic Park project as if it was any other large-scale scheme. To assess the regeneration legacy, post-event evaluations should be undertaken at three different scales: within the Olympic Park; at the fringes of the Olympic Park; and in the Host Boroughs more generally.

In the Olympic Park:
The success of the Park can be evaluated against the OPLC's own targets and / or by using existing criteria that seek to assess the sustainability of urban regeneration projects (e.g. Hemphill et al., 2004). Beyond headline measures (land values, returns on investment) and conventional cost-benefit analyses, there should be scrutiny of more subtle indications of success. Relevant indicators could include the composition of the community that emerges, the quality and quantity of new jobs (and who they go to); levels of community use of new facilities; and spending by visitors from outside the area.

In the fringes of the Olympic Park:
Levels of investment and job creation should be monitored on the fringes of the Olympic Park and there should be efforts to evaluate whether the 2012 project has helped to remove some of the ‘stigma’ that has traditionally restricted economic development in East London. Attempts should also be made to monitor outcomes for those currently living on the fringes of the Park: thus providing an assessment of the original promise to ‘benefit the community through regeneration’ (London 2012, 2004).

In Host Boroughs:
The ‘quality of life’ targets cited in the SRF are the most valuable set of indicators to frame evaluations at a broader geographical scale. The difficulty in related research exercises will be attributing any effects observed to the 2012 project rather than to other interventions. Attempts should be made to estimate the geographical reach of regeneration driven by the Olympic Park. This includes whether the Park has helped to support regeneration in other key sites (Royal Docks, Greenwich Peninsula and the wider Thames Gateway region).

An integrated assessment
This report has focused on plans to deliver transformation in East London. As well as evaluating the ‘transformation agenda’ in isolation, it is important to assess the contribution of physical projects to the other objectives of staging the Games: making the UK a world leading sporting nation; inspiring young people, making the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living; and demonstrating the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place (DCMS, 2007). The 2012 Games were always planned to deliver multiple, integrated objectives and it is right that specific evaluations should take this into consideration.


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